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ABSTRACT. Since the late nineteenth century, orthodox doctrine under the Constitution's
Full Faith and Credit Clause has presumed that the interpretation of that Clause set forth in
Justice Joseph Story's 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States was essentially
sound. This Article argues, however, that Justice Story's view had been endorsed by almost no
one before him and actually contradicted the "classic rule" of faith and credit, which Justice Story
had articulated in 1813. The Supreme Court, moreover, consistently reiterated the "classic rule"
despite Justice Story's change of mind, continuing to do so even after his death. By the 188os,
perhaps due to a lack of critical attention, the "classic rule" of faith and credit had quietly fallen
into desuetude, obscured by respect for Justice Story's name and the impression of authority
associated with his works. This contradiction at the root of modern orthodox Full Faith and
Credit doctrine has never been confronted until now. This Article assesses the historicity and
soundness of both the "classic rule" and Justice Story's interpretation, which is now the
orthodox view, concluding that the "classic rule" is far more defensible textually, grammatically,
historically, and politically. This Article also examines the process by which, and the purpose for
which, discretion over the "Effect" of sister-state "public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings" was conferred upon Congress by the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Finally, this Article argues that the complete and unqualified nature of the discretion
thus vested regarding sister-state effects is an important element of the Constitution's system of
separation of powers and facilitates pragmatic and responsible resolution, from time to time, of
any issues in the conflict of laws that might give rise to significant concern or controversy on a
national scale.
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INTRODUCTION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of our Federal Constitution, after
requiring states to give full "faith and credit" to one another's "public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings," goes on to provide in its second sentence
that "the Congress may by general Laws prescribe" not only "the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved" but also "the Effect
thereof."1 The 179o Act' first exercising this congressional power prescribed
suitable methods for verifying the authenticity and accuracy of state legislative
acts, records, and judicial proceedings, and provided-in, a substantially
different phrase using the same "faith and credit" idiom - that "the said records
and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and
credit given to them in. every court within the United States, as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the state" of their origin.3
Before the Constitution, Article IV of the Articles of Confederation had
mandated giving "full faith and credit" to proceedings of sister-state "courts
and magistrates."'4 Recognizing the "faith and credit" idiom as equivocal,
however, James Madison described the provision as "extremely indeterminate,"
and "of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear."' Perhaps
for this reason, the resolutions that he and other Virginia delegates prepared in
anticipation of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, aimed at strengthening the
national union, included nothing at all resembling the Articles of
Confederation's "faith and credit" provision. Weeks later, however, the
Convention's Committee of Detail proposed adding such a provision, and the
delegates of six states approved the Committee's proposal in an amended form
that mandated the national legislature to prescribe sister-state effect not only
for "Records and judicial Proceedings," but also for "public Acts."
At the same time, apparently prompted by the statements of those opposed
to mandating that the national legislature require states to enforce sister-states'
"public Acts" at odds with their own laws and policies, Madison immediately
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." Id.
2. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122. For the relevant text of the 179o Act, see infra text
accompanying note 217.
3. Id. (emphases added).
4. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. IV, para. 3; see infra note ioo and accompanying
text.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 287 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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moved to make it discretionary with Congress whether and how far to
prescribe sister-state "Effect." Madison's amendment mitigated the concerns of
opponents, and no one objected to the change. The language as altered by
Madison's amendment-"the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof' 6 -was then so generally approved as to obviate any formal
count of the states.
As ultimately promulgated for ratification, the first sentence of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause still retained the equivocal "faith and credit" phrase,
but court decisions under the Articles of Confederation had construed that
phrase as mandating only admissibility and evidentiary sufficiency.7 In
contrast, the power (and discretion) newly conferred upon Congress in the
second sentence of the Constitution's Clause explicitly pertained to sister-state
"Effect." Therefore, while he deprecated the old Articles provision Madison
expressed confidence that "[t]he power here established, may be rendered a
very convenient instrument of justice,",8 noting by way of example that
Congress could prescribe enforcement (without further judicial proceedings)
of sister-state court orders against judgment debtors absconding with goods.
The First Congress's decision to repeat the "faith and credit" idiom in its
1790 Act, albeit with different adjectival terms ("such faith and credit.., as"
instead of "full"9 ), caused confusion among lawyers, judges, and even
legislators. Many believed the statute merely reiterated the evidentiary
principle ordained by the constitutional Clause. In unanimous opinions during
the tenures of Chief Justices Marshall, Taney, and Chase, however, the
Supreme Court consistently affirmed that the phrase "such faith and
credit... as" in the last sentence of the 179o Act prescribed the sister-state
"Effect" to be given to state records and judicial proceedings. In other words,
the last sentence of the 179o Act was held to be an exercise of the power over
6. U.S. CONST. art. TV, § i (emphasis added). For documentation and further detail of the
Convention proceedings summarized in this and the preceding paragraphs, see infra
Part III.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 139-162. Even late in the colonial era there were reasons
for such a provision, which some states had addressed whether or not they undertook to
give other colonies' judgments or other records local effect. See infra text accompanying
notes 77-99.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 287.
9. Compare the text of the 179o Act- "the said records and judicial proceedings... shall have
such faith and credit given to them . . .as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
[originating] state" - with the Full Faith and Credit Clause - "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State" (emphases added). Supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sister-state effect conferred upon Congress by the second sentence of the
constitutional Clause.1"
Thus arose what I call the "classic rule" of faith and credit: that this idiom
as used in the Constitution (where it appears with the adjective "full" -a term
used at the time in evidence law to designate prima facie sufficiency) states a
constitutional principle of evidence, while the comparative adjectival phrase
employing the same idiom in the federal statute dating from 1790 ("such faith
and credit ... as") constitutes a congressional prescription of sister-state effect.
To put it another way: the only provisions of federal law requiring that any of
the United States give effect (as distinguished from prima facie evidentiary
sufficiency) to sister-state "Acts," "Records," or "judicial Proceedings" are
those provisions (if any) that Congress has legislatively prescribed.
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, this "classic rule"
was yielding to quite a different view. After generations the phrase "full faith
and credit" (quite apart from its use in the different context of financial
obligations) had come to be considered a term of art regarding judgments from
other forums. Moreover, habituation to the longstanding replication rule
prescribed by the 179o Act had induced the impression that this term of art-
without regard to the "such... as" adjectival phrase of the 179o Act-by itself
imported sister-state replication of effect. Ironically, while that crucial
modifying phrase in the 179o Act was ignored, the modifier "full" in the
constitutional Clause-which almost no one in the Founding generation had
opined could mean anything more than evidentiary sufficiency" -came to be
1o. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 301-02 (1866) (reciting that the Clause
empowered Congress, whose Act prescribed effect); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
165 (185o) (attributing sister-state effect to Congress's prescription); Hampton v.
McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818) (reaffirming unanimously Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813), which distinguished the import of "full faith and credit" in the
constitutional provision from the import of "faith and credit" in the "such... as" clause of
the Act).
The opinion in Christmas v. Russell also cited to Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution, without evident recognition that before writing that treatise Justice Story
had abandoned the classic rule articulated in Mills, and was arguing instead that replication
of the effect of sister-state judgments is mandated by the constitutional provision itself. See
infra text accompanying notes 3o8-309. The widespread circulation and prestige of Justice
Story's treatise -and the profession's failure to notice (or to appreciate) his deviation from
the classic rule-seem to have been chiefly responsible for the post-Civil War shift in
construing the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
ii. Notably, the 179o Act prescribing the replication rule of effect did not employ the word
"full." Not until enactment of the 1948 Judicial Code, ch. 646, 62 Star. 947 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)), was "full" added to the "faith and credit" phrase in
the statute.
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freighted with superlative import, smothering any doubt that the Clause by
itself was a mandate of sister-state effect. Thus, by a gradual process of
intellectual slippage that was neither recognized nor remarked upon at the
time, it came to be assumed that for a state to give "full faith and credit" to a
sister-state's judgment, for example, means to replicate the effect that it had
where rendered.
This corruption of meaning did more than simply render the last sentence
of the 179o Act redundant. Treating the putative "term of art" as itself a
mandate to replicate sister-state effect made the Full Faith and Clause entirely
"self-executing" and rendered its last four words ("and the Effect thereof')
peculiar and puzzling- if not indeed superfluous.12 Obscuration of the "classic
rule" also rendered nugatory the longstanding determination of Congress
against prescribing any sister-state effect for state "public Acts."13 In 1887, Chief
Justice Waite asserted in dictum that "[w]ithout doubt" the constitutional
Clause by itself means that "the public acts of every state shall be given the
same effect by the courts of another state that they have by law and usage at
home." 4 I call this "Cooley's folly," because the earliest instance that I have
found of this simply ignorant proposition was its assertion by Michigan Judge
and Professor Thomas M. Cooley, who offered neither relevant authority nor
explanation."s Oblivious to its unprecedented novelty, Chief Justice Waite
blithely called this "the logical result of the principles announced as early as
1813... and steadily adhered to ever since." 6  Chief Justice Waite's
interpretation, however, was not a logical result of any principle announced in
relevant Supreme Court opinions; it rather was an extrapolation from the
entirely different view which, by the end of the Constitution's first century,
without critical scrutiny had managed to displace the "classic rule."' 7
12. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249,293 (1992) ("If the constitutional clause
is self-executing and legislation is optional, which is what the constitutional text plainly
says, then Congress was not obliged to speak and congressional silence means nothing.").
13. Not until enactment of the 1948 Judicial Code did Congress extend its "such ... as" rule to
embrace legislation. For discussion of this aspect of the 1948 Code and the consequent reach
of the present federal statute, see infra text accompanying notes 318-323.
14. Chi. & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887).
15. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 185 (188o).
16. Chi. &Alton R.R., 119 U.S. at 622.
17. The different view was that of Justice Story. Although he wrote the Court's first and most
thorough opinion propounding the classic rule in Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481
(1813), Justice Story later abandoned it and propounded the very different view articulated
in his widely circulated treatises and other writings. For further discussion, see infra text
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Conceiving the mandate to replicate effect as constitutional rather than
statutory in origin entirely changed the perceived allocation of power between
the legislative and judicial branches. This sea change occurred during the same
period when due process clauses, both state and federal, were reaching their
zenith as rubrics to justify curtailing legislative discretion by judicial oversight
of substantive regulatory policies.'" It seems more than coincidental that,
beginning in 1887 in one of Chief Justice *Waite's last opinions," and
continuing for some thirty years,2" Supreme Court Justices routinely employed
the idiom "due faith, and credit" as equivalent to, or in lieu of, the "full" faith
and credit phrase. As in the "substantive due process" realm, the Justices were
taking unto themselves the prerogative to decide matters constitutionally
entrusted to the representative political branch.
Since late in the nineteenth century, the proposition that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause constitutionally mandates in "plain language,"' the sister-state
replication of effect, so that the Supreme Court is entitled to determine as a
matter of constitutional law the sister-state effect of "public Acts, Records and
judicial Proceedings," has been treated as axiomatic." Grand (albeit
phantasmal) conceptions of grand purpose 3 for this essentially technical
accompanying notes 302-313. Ironically, Justice Story himself never applied his changed
view to statutes. Indeed, its subsequent extrapolation to them violated Justice Story's own
premises regarding legislative jurisdiction. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
18. An early example was Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(189o), which confused policy with "truth" as "eminently a question for judicial
investigation." Id. at 457-58. The most noted exemplar, of course, was Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. Plumb v. Goodnow's Adm'r, 123 U.S. 560, 562 (1887).
2o. Among the dozens of cases employing the idiom (which virtually disappeared from use after
1918), were Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16, 17 (1918); Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S. 520, 531 (1918);
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 2 (19o9); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 603, 6o5 (19o6);
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33-42 (1903); and Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666
(1892).
21. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 1o6 YALE L.J. 1965, 1976 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271-72 (198o) (Stevens, J.) (plurality
opinion) (noting that "this Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and
credit questions," specifically includes questions of "extraterritorial effect"); Pac. Employers
Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 3o6 U.S. 493, 502 (1939) ("This Court must determine
for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights
asserted under the laws of one state ... by the statute of another state.").
23. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) ("The very purpose
of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties ... and to make them integral parts of a single nation .... "); see also
Kramer, supra note 21, at 1986 ("The central object of the Clause was, in fact, to eliminate a
1590
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"lawyer's clause"4 are reiterated as if they were historically sound, while in fact
they are only unfounded assertions that have deterred, by intimidation, critical
assessment of modern full faith and credit orthodoxy. Thus, dominant
scholarly opinion recites that the sister-state effect -not only of judgments but
also of state statutes (and, many argue, even of nonstatutory law) -is
mandated by the Full Faith and Clause to whatever extent the judiciary, under
the guise of constitutional construction, might decide.2"
In a few relatively recent instances regarding certain matters, however,
Congress has undertaken to alter sister-state obligations regarding effect.26
One especially controversial measure even purports to abrogate entirely any
obligation of states to "give effect. to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State... respecting a relationship between persons of
the same sex that is treated as a marriage."2 7 These indications of a heightened
awareness by Congress of its power regarding sister-state effect, the
consequent rekindling of scholarly debate over the scope of that power, and a
sense that Congress might be approaching the threshold of greater
involvement in choice of law questions, warrant this reexamination of the
origins and evolution of the idiom "faith and credit". in the context of
out-of-state judicial, legislative, and other official acts, records, and
proceedings.
The conclusions summarized in the foregoing paragraphs are among those
to which my study has led, but they exceed what can be thoroughly
documented in this one Article alone. Before undertaking elsewhere to detail
them further, however, it is necessary to examine the status quo ante both to
verify the historicity of what has been lost and to facilitate an assessment of
state's prideful unwillingness to recognize other states' laws or judgments on the ground
that these are inferior or unacceptable. If anything should be off-limits in such a system, it is
the public policy doctrine.").
24. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945).
25. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.3.1, at 150-53 (2d ed. 1995); DAVID P.
CuRRiE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 320 (6th ed. 2001); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The
Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 26-27 (1991); Laycock, supra note 12, at
290-91. As to statutes and nonstatutory law, however, there is significant dissent. See, e.g.,
Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1631, 1635-36
(2005).
26. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000);
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 198o, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; Full Faith and Credit for
Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
27. Defense of Marriage Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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benefits that might ensue were it restored. Thus, the aims of this Article are as
follows: to lay bare the ancient roots from which the classic American rule of
faith and credit emerged; to document that classic rule in contrast to the
initially idiosyncratic construction that rose to dominance in the later
nineteenth century and prevails as the orthodox view today; to note the
resulting loss of a deliberate and important aspect of the Constitution's
separation of powers; and to argue that choice of law problems -if addressed
at all by our national government-are to be resolved in the discretion of the
legislative branch, with its characteristic capacity for accommodation and
political compromise and its greater potential responsiveness to practical
experience and changing needs. These characteristics of the legislative
process-the precipitating reasons, indeed, for the classic rule of faith and
credit- render it particularly suitable to resolving matters controversial enough
to excite sharply divisive passions in a complex and diverse nation still
organized into separate states with populations having independent public
policy prerogatives of their own.
Adequate understanding often requires reaching back in history to a time
before our current habits of thought and expression were formed.
Enlightenment and the opportunities it affords - and not some obligation to
the past for its own sake- is what justifies a thorough study of data from the
period of the Constitution's Framing. The historical information relevant to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been characterized as "meager''2 8 and
"sparse. ' 9 Because considerable work has already been done,3" it has even been
asserted that "there is nothing new to be said."'" Scholarship, however, is a
relay event; and on this lap some hitherto neglected data- as well as previously
unnoticed connections among data already familiar-have been found.32 The
28. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 739 (1986); Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent
A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 153
(1949).
29. James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 6o S. CAL. L.
REV. 1299, 1302 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-
Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998).
31. Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 491
(2005).
32. In addition to the present article, the interested reader will find enlightening the
forthcoming work of Stephen Sachs. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early
Congress, 95 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2009) (on file with author). Although the first
1592
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findings, moreover, point toward conclusions that are highly unorthodox
today.
Part I of this Article examines the practice of English courts regarding prior
judgments during periods that were relatively recent and familiar history to the
Framers. It reveals a variety of practices not only differing in common law
courts from other English tribunals, but also differing within common law
courts themselves depending on the nature of the previous forum. The
situation was more complicated than subsequent scholars' generalizations
accounted for. Failures to recognize the earlier complexities operated to obscure
and even to discredit the longstanding distinction in English practice between
treating an earlier judgment as prima facie evidence and according it conclusive
effect. Also obscured was the demonstrable equivocation in English legal usage
of such words as "credit," "faith," and "full." A more accurate picture of older
English practice is thus fundamental to an accurate understanding of American
provisions that were formulated against the backdrop of that older and now
unfamiliar practice.
Part I also identifies two features of the older English practice that
significantly obstructed enforcement of judgments in the colonies, and
examines the legislative responses of certain colonies to those features. These
responses more or less prefigured the remedy that, in the post-Revolution
period, the "full faith and credit" mandates of the Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution evidently were meant to provide.
Part II examines the "full faith and credit" mandate appearing in the
Articles of Confederation. Beyond considering the words of that provision in
part of Sachs's article surveys the context and some of the development of the "faith and
credit" phrase, the principal focus of his work is the decades of effort in Congress, ending in
1822, regarding various proposals to amend or replace the faith and credit statute enacted by
the first Congress in 1790. He documents very well the disagreement that persisted during
that period, even after the Supreme Court had spoken on the matter, as to whether the 1790
Act actually prescribed any sister-state effect at all, as distinguished from merely affirming
the prima facie evidence rule mandated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself. While
Sachs avoids endorsing my own understanding of the 179o Act's meaning regarding sister-
state "Effect" any further than to acknowledge that it "is intriguing," id. (manuscript at 16
n.103), his work is more than merely complementary to mine; for he reaches the same
conclusion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself was certainly not understood in that
period to mandate any sister-state "effect." That was precisely why-until the Supreme
Court's "classic rule" came to be generally accepted-so much effort was repeatedly
expended toward enacting a (more incontestable) statutory rule of "Effect."
Of course, the strongest evidence of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause meant to the
people in whose time it was written is to be found in surviving records of the historic and
contemporary usage of the phrase and the words comprising it, and the actual legal practices
of that time; evidence that contemporaries did not fall prey to the misunderstandings
pervasive today is simply corroborative - albeit significantly so.
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the context of contemporaneous legal usage, Part II examines a report of a
Continental Congress committee as well as state court opinions from the
Articles period to show that, while the Articles of Confederation's "faith and
credit" mandate served important evidentiary purposes, it was not generally
regarded as addressing the "Effect" that state records or proceedings should
have in sister states.
That question, however, was expressly addressed when the counterpart
provision was considered at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Prior studies
of the Convention materials have failed to discern either the fact of, or the
reasons for, the delegates' acceptance of James Madison's motion to vest entire
discretion over sister-state effect in the national legislature. In Part III, new
insight into the relevant actions at the Convention is produced by a much
closer parsing of successive committee reports, delegate dialogue, and motions
than has been undertaken in previous works.
Part IV documents the exercise by the First Congress of its discretion in
choosing among conceivable alternatives regarding not only possible methods
of proving state acts, records, and proceedings, but also the effect (if any) that
sister-states should be obligated to give them. Part IV also reviews the diversity
of judicial opinion during the early period as to whether, by the peculiar
wording of its 179o Act, the First Congress had actually prescribed any sister-
state effect at all. The reader will note, however, that nearly everyone in that
period whose opinion was recorded and survives appears to have agreed that
the Constitution plainly distinguishes between evidentiary "full faith and
credit" (mandated by the Clause itself) and sister-state effect (which was
assigned for Congress to prescribe).
Part V examines the Court's opinion in Mills v. Dury e"3 as well as the
separate opinions earlier expressed by the several Justices who sat together in
1813 to consider that first-and classic-Supreme Court Full Faith and Credit
Clause case. It also summarizes how Justice Joseph Story-who wrote the
Court's opinion articulating the "classic rule" in Mills -later changed his view
and, through his extrajudicial publications, became the person most
responsible for ultimately displacing the classic rule of faith and credit.
Finally, in conclusion I will discuss the possibility that a revival of the
classic rule -reaffirming and employing an important, though long neglected,
facet of the Constitution's separation of powers - might substantially
contribute toward constructive resolution, now and for the future, of
controversial issues involving the choice of law.
33. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
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I. THE PRACTICE BEFORE AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
A. The Common Law's Treatment of Prior Judgments
Chief Justice Stone in the mid-twentieth century declared that the "clear
purpose" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution was to
"establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common
law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the
rights of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was
rendered. '34 Chief Justice Stone's estimate of the purpose of the Clause,
however, was conditioned by an oversimplified impression of older English
practice that by his time had become widely accepted. This Part takes a closer
look.
The old Royal Courts of Justice at Westminster applying England's
common law" were the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas,
and the Court of the Exchequer.3" Their jurisdictions were originally distinct
but gradually overlapped. They were called the "courts of record" 6 because
parchment transcripts of pleadings and rulings there were kept secure in the
Treasury. These "Records" -"the Invention that perpetuate the Decisions of
Law," and "lye as Precedents for future Observation"37-were considered
"authentick beyond all Manner of Contradiction,'',8 and thus were
incontrovertible proof of what had .happened in each case: "they admit no
averment, plea, or proofe to the contrarie."39 Once a matter had gone to
judgment in one of these three courts, relitigation was precluded by doctrines
of res judicata: the common law claim was extinguished by "merger" into the
judgment, and the parties were estopped from maintaining contrary to the
issues adjudged.
34. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943).
35. The judges or barons of any two of these tribunals could sit in the Exchequer Chamber to
review some decisions of the third. Parliament also decided some cases by the common law.
At least from the early eighteenth century, Parliament occasionally created other tribunals as
"courts of record," such as the Courts of Conscience. See 1 WLLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 189-91 (7th ed. 1956).
36. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND; OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITrLETON § 438 (lst American ed. 1853) (1628).
37. GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 61, 92 (3d ed. 1769).
38. Id. at 7.
39. 2 COKE, supra note 36, § 438.
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A judgment of one of these three courts could be pleaded in bar, and if it
were, the proper plea in traverse was "nul tiel record" ("no such record") .40 If
that issue were joined, instead of a jury trial there would be a "trial by record,"
the proponent producing the record for examination by the judges themselves.
The original record could not be produced, however, for it must remain in the
Treasury; instead, a copy would be produced, authenticated, and verified by
appropriate official seal. 4' The original being incontestable, a true copy was as
well-and the judges, themselves bound by the record, would decide the issue
on that record alone.
Also, a common law judgment could be offered as evidence on issues joined
on a plea of the general issue or some other appropriate plea, but in these
circumstances a copy attested either by official seal or by testimony would be
put to the jury like other evidence. 42 If the jury found the prior judgment as a
fact, however, it was bound to return a verdict consistent therewith, for "[a]
jury cannot find against an estoppel in a point tried. 43
There were many courts in England that were not "courts of record" and
not bound to apply the common law. Some of these were also royal courts: the
Admiralty, the Chancery, and various ecclesiastical courts (since the king was
head of the Church in England). The common law courts were bound to defer
to these other royal courts within their respective jurisdictions -but not
because of res judicata, for that doctrine applied only to common law
judgments. The obligation of deference to the other royal courts derived
instead from the fact that they were instruments of the same sovereign, each
performing their functions on behalf of the same crown.
Also among England's courts not-of-record were many that were not part
of the royal justice system at all. These "inferior" courts, as they were called,
included the county courts, courts of the hundreds, courts baron, and others
that had existed even before the eleventh-century Norman Conquest. Because
they were not royal courts, these inferior courts merited no deference; and
because they were not common law courts, the res judicata doctrines of merger
40. HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIL ACTIONS 122
(London, Butterworth & Son 1824).
41. See GILBERT, supra note 37, at 14 ("[T]he Courts of Justice that put their Seals to the Copy,
are supposed more capable to examine, and more exact and critical in their Examinations,
than any other Person is or can be; and besides there is more Credit to be given to their Seal,
than to the Testimony of any private Person; and therefore we are more sure of a fair and
perfect Copy when it comes attested under their Seals, than if it were a Copy sworn to by
any private Person whatsoever.").
42. See id. at 21-30.
43. Trevivan v. Lawrence, (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 1003, 1004 (Q:B.) (Holt, C.J.).
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and estoppel could not apply. A plaintiff who had prevailed in an inferior court,
however, might bring an action of debt (or later, indebitatus assumpsit) in a
common law court, counting on the inferior court judgment as a constructive
debt or implied undertaking by the other party. The inferior court's
judgment-proved by the testimony of witnesses to that proceeding (since
there was no "record" of it)-would be taken as prima facie proof of the
obligation that the plaintiff claimed, and would shift to the defendant the
burden of pleading and proving inaccuracy, mistake, or some other injustice
sufficient to defeat the prima facie case. 44
The question of giving effect to foreign adjudications arose first in the
Admiralty. "[T] he proceedings in the Court of the Admiralty are according to
the course of the civil law,"' 4' and thus, sharing legal premises in common,
England's Admiralty enforced determinations of civil law courts abroad,
whether according to maritime law or under the Roman-based civil law in
general. As early as 1536, there was a case in the Admiralty for "execution of
sentence of French Court."46 In 1607, the King's Bench denied the habeas
corpus petition of a debtor imprisoned by the Admiralty to enforce a money
judgment of a Dutch court, observing that "this is by the law of nations, that
the justice of one nation should be aiding to the justice of another nation, and
for one to execute the judgment of the other," but adding that "the Judge of the
Admiralty is the proper magistrate for this purpose; for he only hath the
execution of the civil law within the realm. 
4 7
44. Herbert v. Cook, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 56o, 563 (K.B.); 1 COKE, supra note 36, § 175.
45. Thomlinson's Case, (1605) 77 Eng. Rep. 1379, 1379 (C.P.); see MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 23-24 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1971) (1739); Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law, in
3 LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS: 1835-1935, at 342, 355 (1937).
46. De Pratte v. Le Cherewyck, Y.B. (Adm. 1536), noted in 2 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY, in 11 SELDEN SOCIETY PUB., at lxv (1897). A similar case is Mychell v. Ronnall
(Adm. 1570), printed in I SELDEN SOCIETY PUB., at 140. Max Radin considered each of these
cases to be "not a matter of maritime law but an ordinary suit in contract or tort." Max
Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1, 13-14
(1944).
47. Wier's Case, Pasch 15 Jae. 1, Roll. 530 (1607), reprinted in 6 CHARLES VINER, GENERAL
ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 512-13 (2d ed. 1792). The case is also cited and
summarized as "Wibred and Wyer's case" in Jurado v. Gregory, (1669) 84 Eng. Rep. 320
(K.B.). Rolle's account is quoted in full in Hessel E. Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REV. 29, 1143 n.22 (1935) (reprinting 1 HENRY
ROLLE, UN ABRIDGMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMON LEG pl. 12, at
530 (London 1663)).
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The Chancery, too, treated foreign judgments as binding-although only
between the parties, and not on the court itself.
8
England's common law courts treated foreign admiralty determinations as
conclusive. 49 The leading case was Hughes v. Cornelius, in which the jury by
special verdict acknowledged a French condemnation decree, but also found
that the ship was not lawfully subject to that condemnation. The King's Bench
held the French decree conclusive nevertheless."0 Commentators on "full faith
and credit" have commonly cited Hughes v. Cornelius as if it typified the
treatment that foreign judgments of all kinds received (or should have
received) from England's common law courts, s . but that is a profound mistake.
Its holding turned entirely on the peculiar characteristics of admiralty. s2 With
its international ramifications and its in rem jurisdiction, admiralty was the
exception, not the rule.
The English common law courts treated foreign nonadmiralty judgments
very differently. The common law doctrines of merger and estoppel could no
more apply to nonadmiralty judgments from foreign civil law countries than to
judgments of "inferior" English tribunals; thus, these foreign judgments could
not be pleaded in bar. They could be used, however, as evidence under some
other appropriate plea. For example, they could be used in an action of debt or
indebitatus assumpsit as prima facie evidence of a debt or implied -undertaking;
or they could be used upon requisite showings 3 in defense. Alluding to .the
48. See, e.g., Burrows v. Jemino, (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (Ch.); Gold v. Canham, (1679) 36 Eng.
Rep. 640 (Ch.).
49. Bernardi v. Motteux, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 364, 365, 367 (K.B.); Lumly v. Quarry, (1702) 87
Eng. Rep. io6i (K.B.).
5o. Hughes v. Cornelius, (1682) 83 Eng. Rep. 247 (K.B.). Other reports of the same leading case
appear at Hughes v. Cornelius, (1682) 90 Eng. Rep. 28 (K.B.) and Hughes v. Cornelius,
(1682) 89 Eng. Rep. 907 (K.B.).
51. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 45; Radin, supra note 46, at 14-15; Sack, supra note 45,
at 382-83.
52. This accords with the explanation of Hughes v. Cornelius given by the Attorney General in
argument of a highly celebrated case, the transcript of which was published by order of the
House of Peers as The Trial of Elizabeth Duchess Dowager of Kingston for Bigamy. THE TRIAL
OF ELIZABETH DUCHESS DOWAGER OF KINGSTON FOR BIGAMY 52 (1776), reprinted in 2o STATE
TRIALS No. 551, at 355-652 (photo. reprint 2000) (T.B. Howell ed., 1814); see also TRIAL OF
THE DUCHESS OF KINGSTON 134 (Lewis Melville ed., 1927).
53- See the discussion by Lord Hardwicke, soon after he left King's Bench, in Gage v. Bulkeley,
(1744) 27 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch.). One would have to be able to discern exactly what had been
determined. See, e.g., Bernardi v. Motteux, (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 364, 365, 367 (K.B.); ef.
Barzillai v. Lewis, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 573 (K.B.). It would also have to be shown who was
the foreign judge, in what forum he acted, and "for what the sentence was given." Beak v.
Tyrrell, (1689) 90 Eng. Rep. 623 (K.B.).
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former in a 1705 opinion, the Lord Keeper observed, "Although the plaintiff
obtained a judgment or sentence in. France, yet here the debt must be
considered as a debt by simple contract. The plaintiff can maintain no action
here, but an indebitatus assumpsit. . .. " Being only evidence, however, the
prior judgment would of course be vulnerable to impeachment or being
outweighed by contrary evidence.
Most notable for our present purposes, England's common law courts
treated judgments from other common law jurisdictions the same as they
treated those from civil law countries: common law determinations from places
outside of England herself- whether subject to England by virtue of conquest,
diplomacy, colonization, or otherwise -were treated as "foreign" by England's
common law courts. Foreign common law "records" were not-records in the
eyes of the courts sitting at Westminster. Hence, in England there was no
merger or estoppel with respect to these foreign common law judgments.
Lacking res judicata effect, such judgments could not be pleaded. Lord
Hardwicke wished that it were otherwise, and observed in a 1737 case that a
rule of res judicata as between the courts of Ireland and England would be
"very desirable.";- but he and his fellow Justices in that case were obliged to
recognize that such was not the law."5 Seventeen years later, Lord Hardwicke
expressed a similar wish for res judicata as between Scotland and England, 6
but that wish, too, went unfulfilled.
Foreign common law judgments, however, could be used as evidence under
the same prima facie rule that applied to foreign civil law judgments and to
judgments of English inferior courts not-of-record. Thus in 1771, in Sinclair v.
Fraser, the House of Lords considered a determination by the Court of Sessions
in Scotland that the plaintiff in an action on a judgment from the colony of
Jamaica must prove the "ground, nature, and extent of the demand on which
the judgment in Jamaica had been irregularly or unduly obtained." 7 The Lords
held that the Jamaican judgment must "be received as evidence prima facie of
54. Dupleix v. De Roven, (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 950, 951 (Ch.). Lord Hardwicke made the same
point. See Gage, 27 Eng. Rep. at 824.
5S. Otway v. Ramsay, (1737) 107 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114-15 (K.B.); see infra text accompanying
notes 88-94.
56. 1 ALEXANDER F.T. WOODHOUSELEE, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE
HONOURABLE HENRY HOME OF KAMES 294-98 (2d ed. 1814); 1 PHILIP C. YORKE, THE LIFE
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF PHILIP YORKE, EARL OF HARDWICKE, LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF
GREAT BRITAIN 623 (1913).
57- Walker v. Witter, (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 1, 3n-4n (H.L.) (discussing the 1771 case Sinclair v.
Fraser); see also 2 THOMAS S. PATON, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED IN THE HOUSE'OF LORDS
UPON APPEAL FROM SCOTLAND 1757-84, at 253-54 (reporting Sinclair, although with less
detail).
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the debt," leaving it "upon the defendant to impeach the justice thereof, or to




In Crawford v. Witten in 1773, the King's Bench gave judgment for the
plaintiff in an action of assumpsit on the judgment of a court in Bengal,
overruling defendant's demurrer that "they are governed by different laws. " "
Any underlying difference of law, Chief Justice Mansfield declared, could not
rebut "a promise confirmed by judgment in a territory subject to Great
Britain.' ' 6o Justice Ashhurst added, "I have often known assumpsit brought on
judgments in foreign Courts; the judgment is a sufficient consideration to
support the implied promise., 61 Justice Aston observed that "[t]he Court has
no doubt about the matter. ,6
Walker v. Witter in 1778 was an action of debt in the King's Bench on a
Jamaican judgment. Defendant pleaded nul tiel record, and moved for judgment
on that plea when plaintiffs produced a judgment under seal of the Jamaican
court. Defendant maintained that the judgment from Jamaica was not a
"record., 6 ' The Justices agreed it was not technically a "record," because
"[t]hat description is confined properly to certain Courts in England, and their
judgments cannot be controverted. Foreign Courts, and Courts in England not
of record, have not that privilege, nor the Courts in Wales, &C.,64 While
agreeing that "the plea of nul tiel record was improper, ''6' however, they
disregarded that plea as a "mere nullity ' 66 because plaintiffs' declaration had
fairly described it "as a record of a Court in Jamaica,, 67 and "[a]s such it [was]
to be tried by the country.., and not by the Court."68 "Foreign judgments are
a ground of action every where, but they are examinable," said Lord Mansfield,
recalling an illustration from Lord Hardwicke's time. 69 The other three Justices
58. Walker, 99 Eng. Rep. at 3P (discussing the 1771 case Sinclair v. Fraser).
59. Crawford v. Witten, (1773) 98 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.). The case is discussed in Walker v.
Witter, 99 Eng. Rep. at 2n-3n.
6o. Crawford, 98 Eng. Rep. at 584.
61. Walker, 99 Eng. Rep. at 3n (quoting Justice Ashhurst's statement in Crawford).
62. Crawford, 98 Eng. Rep. at 584.
63. Walker, 99 Eng. Rep. at 4-6.
64. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id. at 4-5.
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were "of the same opinion. " " Defendant Witter did have an opportunity to
rebut the foreign judgment, for he also had pleaded nil debet (the "general
issue" to an action of debt), but on the issue joined under that plea, the jury
had returned for the plaintiffs.
In 1789, in Galbraith v. Neville, Justice Buller declared,
The doctrine which was laid down in Sinclair v. Fraser has always been
considered as the true line ever since; namely, that the foreign
judgment shall be prima facie evidence of the debt, and conclusive till
it be impeached by the other party.... It was.., held [in Walker v.
Witter], that the foreign judgment was only to be taken to be right
prima facie; that is, we will allow the same force to a foreign
judgment, that we do to those of our own Courts not of record.... In
short the result is this; that it is prim! facie evidence of the justice of
the demand in an action of assumpsit, having no more credit than is
given to every species of written agreement, viz. that it shall be
considered as good till it is impeached.7'
This was the practice known to early Americans trained in the English common
law. The nineteenth century, however, brought profound changes in England's
law and legal institutions.72 Before long, the traditional prima facie rule
regarding foreign judgments, as well as the circumstances of common law
theory and practice in which it had flourished, had passed beyond easy recall.
Those circumstances having grown so obscure, in the twentieth century even
the distinguished comparativist Hessel Yntema deprecated the prima facie rule
as "apparently fixed in the English common law for a period by Lord
Mansfield. ' 73 Legal historian Max Radin similarly disparaged Walker v. Witter
as a "quite aberrant decision, '74 describing the statements of Mansfield and his
fellow justices therein as indicative of "a great confusion. ' 75 Kurt Nadelmann in
turn called Walker v. Witter "probably the first English decision denying
conclusive effect to a foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent
70. Id. at 6.
71. (1789) 99 Eng. Rep. at 5 n.2 (K.B.).
72. See A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM: TWELVE LECTURES ON THE CHANGES IN THE LAW OF
ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (photo. reprint 1993) (1901).
73. Hessel E. Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L.
REV. 1129, 1143 n.22 (1935).
74. Radin, supra note 46, at 16.
75. Id. at 12.
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jurisdiction." 6 In significant contrast, no doubt as to the historicity of the
prima facie rule was ever expressed by those living when and where America's
institutions were being formed.
On the other hand, two features of English law presented important
obstacles for the colonies regarding foreign (including each other's)
judgments. These are discussed in the Section that follows. Recognizing these
typically overlooked obstacles is crucial to understanding the purpose and
function of the "full faith and credit" provisions later inserted in the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution.
B. Foreign Seals and the Local Enforcement Rule: The Holdings in Olive and
Otway
The first of these obstacles was the difficulty of proving the authenticity
and accuracy of purported judgments from another colony or other place. In
England, copies of records and other documents bearing "Seals of Public
Credit," such as those of England's royal courts, were accepted as authentic and
accurate and were considered "full Evidence in themselves," without
testimonial corroboration, because those seals (like the law itself) "are
supposed to be known to every Body. '7 7 This rationale could not avail as to
foreign seals, any more than it could as to private seals, which "'tis not possible
to suppose.., to be universally known"78 in England.
On this ground, the Exchequer Barons held in 1659, in Olive v. Gwin, that a
copy under the seal of a court in Wales was not evidence.7 9 Wales had been a
principality of England, and then in formal union with her for over a hundred
years; if its official seals were not probative in England's common law courts,
a fortiori seals from abroad surely could not be. Olive was therefore regarded as
foreclosing the most convenient and efficient means of proving copies of
foreign (including colonial) judgments in common law courts, either in
England or anywhere else where the common law prevailed-including, of
course, the American colonies.
The Exchequer Barons "agreed that a sworn copy of a record in Wales,
might be given in evidence, ''8 ° but no such testimony had been offered in Olive
76. Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 50.
77. GILBERT, supra note 37, at 19-2p.
78. Id. at 20.
79. (1659) 145 Eng. Rep. 409 (Exch.). Parliament, however, could and did ordain that particular
seals be accepted for some purposes. See id. at 410.
So. Id. at 410.
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v. Gwin.s1 The reason for this failure is not explained, but speculation is hardly
required: at common law, parties could not testify on their own behalf, and
therefore someone else who had compared the copy with the original located
elsewhere (perhaps far away) would have to be brought from that place to
swear to its authenticity and accuracy. Occasionally this might not be too
difficult, but given eighteenth-century conditions of travel and
accommodation, it often must have been inconvenient and expensive-
sometimes prohibitively so. The rule of Olive v. Gwin precluding acceptance of
foreign seals thus posed a significant impediment to proof of sister-colony and
other "foreign" judgments in colonial courts, whether or not the rationale for
that rule seems persuasive today.
Some colonies eventually overcame this resistance to foreign seals.
Maryland, for example, enacted in 1715 an act "Providing what shall be good
Evidence to prove Foreign and other Debts," stating "That all Debts or records,
whether by judgment, recognizance, Deed inrolled, and upon Record, the
Exemplification thereof, under the Seal of the Courts where the said Judgment
was given, or was recorded, shall be a sufficient Evidence to prove the same. ,82
Similarly, South Carolina in 1731 enacted a law stating that a variety of
documents, including "exemplifications of records" and other instruments
under seal,
attested to have been proved upon oath under the corporation seal of
the Lord Mayor of London, or of any other Mayor or chief officer of
any city, Borrough or town corporate, in any of his Majesty's
dominions, or under the hand of the Governor and public seal of any
of his Majesty's plantations in America, or under the notarial seal of
any notary public, shall be deemed and adjudged good and sufficient
in law, in any of the courts of judicature in this Province, as if the
witnesses to such deeds were produced and proved the same viva
voce.
8 3
81. A separate report of the case reveals the Barons eventually did rule for the defendant, but no
accompanying explanation survives. See Olive, 82 Eng. Rep. at 1304.
2a. Act of June 3, 1715, printed in ACTS OF ASSEMBLY PASSED IN THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND,
FROM 1612, TO 1715, No. 85 (London, John Baskett 1723); see Robert E. Childs, Full Faith and
Credit: The Lawyer's Clause, 36 KY. L.J. 30, 35-36 (1947) (quoting the act); Whitten, supra
note 30, at 275 (same). Copies of records under seal "are call'd by a particular Name
Exemplifications, and are of better Credit than any sworn Copy." GILBERT, supra note 37, at
14.
83. Act of Aug. 20, 1731, No. 552, § 40, printed in PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-
CAROLINA 123, 129 (photo. reprint 1981) (John Faucheraud Grimk6 ed., 1790); see
Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 39; Whitten, supra note 30, at 276. A similar but more limited
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Both of these measures seem designed to overcome the rule of Olive v. Gwin,
the colonists apparently being more confident that they could distinguish
genuine foreign seals from fake ones than the Exchequer Barons had been
generations before. It is notable, however, that neither Maryland nor South
Carolina contemplated a rule of intercolonial res judicata: both called for
exemplifications to be "sufficient," or "good and sufficient" evidence, but not
to be "conclusive." "Sufficient" evidence establishes a fact prima facie, but
subject to contrary proof if any can be shown at trial.
The second obstacle regarding foreign judgments resulted from application
of the old "locality" rule. In medieval England, because they were to judge by
their own knowledge, it was essential that jurors be drawn from the place
where the facts of a case occurred. Common law pleadings were therefore
required to identify that place-to "lay the venue." For the same reason, "the
rule became established that a jury could not inquire into any matter that did
not take place within the given locality."8 4
This locality rule relaxed gradually throughout the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries as cases involving facts in more than one place grew
more common,8 ' but it remained true that proceedings for enforcement of
common law judgments "must be brought in the same county, where the first
action was laid."8 6 Consequently, for example, "if a man recover a debt in the
Court of Norwich, and will bring his action of debt upon that record in the
Common Pleas, he must lay his action in Norwich. 8 7
On this principle, in 1737 the King's Bench held in Otway v. Ramsay that an
action of debt could not lie in Ireland on a judgment of King's Bench in
England. Ireland at that time was "part of the dominions of the Crown of
England, but no part of the realm,"89 although it shared the common law.
statute was enacted by Parliament the next year, (1732) 5 Geo. 2, c. 7 (Eng.), but it was
crafted specifically to assist residents of the homeland.
84. Sack, supra note 45, at 346 (citing fourteenth-century cases). In addition, a statute required
(on pain of abatement) that "writs of debt and accompt, and all other such actions," be
"taken in their counties ... where the contracts of the same actions did rise." (1383) 6 Rich.
2, c. 2 (Eng.).
85. See Sack, supra note 45, at 357-71.
86. Musgrave v. Wharton, (1611) 8o Eng. Rep. 154 (Exch.).
87. Hall v. Winckfield, (c. 1620) 80 Eng. Rep. 342, 343 (C.P.). Chief Justice Hobart explained in
that case that peculiar circumstances might sometimes warrant a choice of venue. Id.
88. Otway v. Ramsay, quoted in (1734, 1736 & 1738) 107 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1113 n.(a) (K.B.). The
Otway case is briefly noted also in Otway v. Ramsay, (1738) 93 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B.).
89. Otway, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1114-15 n.(a).
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"[A]ctions of debt upon judgments," Chief Justice Hardwicke explained, "must
be considered as a local matter."90 Justice Probyn agreed - as did Justice Page,
who added, "the actions brought upon judgments must be local; and as this
has been determined in regard to the different counties of England, sure it
ought to hold between the kingdoms of England and Ireland."'"
The Justices in Otway were unhappy with the result they felt compelled to
reach, and noted that happier results prevailed among civil law systems (and in
admiralty matters, even in England). As Chief Justice Hardwicke explained,
[I]t seems hard if a judgment given here [in King's Bench] should not
be res judicata in Ireland. For in proceedings by the civil law where all
nations proceed by the same rules a sentence given in one nation is
held valid by another; wherefore a sentence given in France by the
Court of Admiralty there for the condemnation of a ship, is, by a
proper certificate of the Court, held valid here. 92
Indeed, Chief Justice Hardwicke had ordered additional argument specifically
addressing "what credit is to be given by one Court, to the acts of a Court of
another nation" where both proceed by the common law, because "[i]t is very
desirable in such case that the judgment given in one kingdom should be
considered as res judicata in another."93 In the end, though, he and the Justices
with him felt compelled to acknowledge that the law was to the contrary.
Otway's enforcement venue rule would equally preclude actions in England
to enforce judgments of Irish courts; indeed, it would preclude suits in any
common law jurisdiction to enforce judgments from any other.94 While
Otway's rule might not countermand a colonial act like that of South Carolina
or Maryland quoted earlier, it would otherwise prevent one American colony
from enforcing money judgments of another colony.
Later in the eighteenth century, both the refusal to accept foreign seals and
the requirement of local venue for enforcement seem to have lost much
go. Id. at 1115 n.(a).
91. Id. Justice Chapple, on the other hand, thought his colleagues' opinions "very hard,"
because in that case it meant that "plaintiff cannot recover his loss." Id.
92. Id. at 1114 n.(a).
93. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 56 (discussing Hardwicke's similar unfulfilled
wish regarding Scotland).
94- The willingness of England's common law courts to countenance fictions circumventing this
restriction, see Sack, supra note 4S, at 370-71, does not prove a similar disposition among
colonial jurists.
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importance in England itself. The action of Parliament in Sinclair and the
actions of King's Bench in Crawford, Walker, and Galbraith9" seem inconsistent
with commitment to either proposition, although neither was squarely
addressed. Counsel in Walker had relied upon both Olive and Otway,96 but the
case report indicates no mention of either by any Justice.
In the British colonies, however, the older cases seem to have remained a
source of concern, or at least of confusion. Hence, three years after Sinclair v.
Fraser, the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted a more elaborate solution. The
colony's Governor Hutchinson described it to the Board of Trade in London as
designed "[t]o make the record [more accurately, a copy of the record] of a
judgment in the neighboring Colonies evidence equal to the judgment itself
[that is, to the original record]. As the Superior Court have been in doubt
whether such record [such copy] could be admitted, the provision by the Act
becomes necessary."97 This 1774 Massachusetts Bay act authorized judgment
creditors under sister-colony judgments to bring actions of debt thereon in
Massachusetts, "in such way and manner as he or they might have done if such
judgment or judgments had been originally recovered ... in this province.", 8
This obviated for Massachusetts Bay the enforcement venue rule represented
by Otway v. Ramsay. In addition, the issue of authenticity and accuracy of
foreign seals was addressed by specifying "a true copy of the
record.., according to the custom and usage of the colony where said
judgment or judgments were.., recovered '"99-permitting, for example, copies
sealed in compliance with the practice of the colony whence they came. Thus,
the 1774 Massachusetts Bay act also obviated for Massachusetts Bay the
obstacle represented by Olive v. Gwin.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 58-71.
96. See Walker v. Witter, (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 1, 4 (K.B.).
97. Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Governor
Hutchinson).
98. 5 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1769-1780), § i, at 323
(1774) [hereinafter ACTS AND RESOLVES], reprinted in CHARTERS AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE
COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 684 (1814).
99. Id. § 2, at 685.
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II. THE PRACTICE DURING THE CONFEDERATION ERA
A. The "Full Faith and Credit" Mandate of the Articles of Confederation
No surviving document details the considerations that led to including in
the Articles of Confederation the mandate that "[flull faith and credit shall be
given in each of these states to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the
courts and magistrates of every other state."1 ' This was another attempt, like
the Massachusetts Bay act and the earlier efforts in Maryland and South
Carolina, to deal with the lingering consequences of Olive and Otway-this
time on a union-wide basis.
None of those colonial measures had used the phrase "full faith and
credit" -nor, for that matter, any of those words separately.' Nevertheless, in
addition to having been used for centuries in diplomatic instruments to vouch
for the authenticity of instruments and the authority of envoys,0 2 and
continuing to be used in notarial and other certifications to vouch for identity,
authority, and authenticity,0 3 all of the words in the phrase "full faith and
credit" were in regular use by English and American lawyers at the time in
discussions about evidence.
"[T]he most influential eighteenth-century book on evidence,"'0 4 "the
leading work on the subject,"'05 was Sir Geoffrey Gilbert's Law of Evidence,
loo. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. W, para. 3. No such provision appeared in the
draft considered in 1776; it was added before the final version was approved "in Congress
assembled" the next year.
iao. The word "faith" came into Middle English from the Old French 'feit," derived from the
Latin "fidem"-belief, reliance, or trust. 5 THE OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed.
1989). "Credit" came from a French modification of the Italian "credito," derived from the
Latin "creditus," a past participle meaning "believed." 3 id. at 1138. This etymology confirms
the usage of these terms- and of derivatives such as credible, creditable, creditworthy, and
faithful, and equivalents like trust, trustworthiness, believability, and belief- that continues
even today.
102. See Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 47-48 & nn.7o-74; Radin, supra note 46; G.W.C. Ross,
"Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 MINN. L. REv. 140, 140-41 & nn.4-5 (1936);
Sachs, supra note 32 (manuscript at 17-20).
103. Easily accessible examples appear in the early Supreme Court case of Yeaton v. Fry, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 335 (18o9). This usage long continued. See, e.g., Sewall v. Haymaker, 127 U.S. 719,
720-21 (1888) (certification by court clerk); Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 868, 871
(McLean, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Me. 1830) (No. 7418) (attestation by Secretary of the
Treasury); Langford v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 338, 345 (1876) (certification by court clerk).
104. John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REy. 1168, 1172 (1996).
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apparently completed around 1711 but published only posthumously in 1756,
with several later editions. Nadelmann ascertained that "[i]n the American
Colonies, the Law of Evidence was in constant use in the courts soon after
appearance. '', °6 This foundational treatise frequently used "faith," and
constantly used "credit" - as a noun, as a verb, and in adjectival forms - to refer
to the relative probative worth of evidence and to the degree of belief or
confidence it deserved.
Gilbert frequently used comparative adjectives such as "more," "better,"
"higher," "highest," "greatest," and "most absolute" to signify different degrees
of credit.'0 7 Previous commentators have asserted that Gilbert used the
adjective "full" in the same way, to denote the highest level of credit:
"conclusive eviden[ce], ' , °s or "res judicata effect."' 09 A closer reading of
Gilbert, however, reveals that his ubiquitous treatise on evidence employed the
word "full" very differently.
For example, while he distinguished among different "Seals of Publick
Credit" in terms of the degree of credit they deserved (the Broad Seal being
"the highest Evidence" and meriting "more Faith"'), Gilbert stressed that all
ios. T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 504 (1999); see also 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *367 n.(n) (calling it an "excellent treatise");
THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, at iv (18oi) (calling Gilbert's
book "the basis of every subsequent work on the subject"); James Wilson, Of Man as an
Individual, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 197, 221 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967)
(describing Gilbert as "deservedly the most approved writer on this part of the law").
1o6. Nadlemann, supra note 30, at 41.
107. See GILBERT, supra note 37, at io, 14, 17, 60, 159.
1o8. Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-
Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 522 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction] ; Ralph U.
Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEM.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1981) 12-13 [hereinafter Whitten, State Choice of Law]. Nadelmann
had made the same mistake of assuming that Gilbert used "full" to import the highest level
of credit. Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 44; see also Laycock, supra note 12, at 296 ("Full faith
and credit is the maximum possible credit; it is conceptually impossible to give faith and
credit that is more than full.").
1o9. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 1o8, at 523; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5 1304, at 18o (1833) ("[T]he
framers of the confederation, and the constitution ... intended to give, not only faith and
credit ... but to give to them full faith and credit; that is, to attribute to them positive and
absolute verity, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied .. .
11o. GILBERT, supra note 37, at 14-15.
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of them "are full Evidence in themselves without any Oath made."''. He
contrasted the Seals of Publick Credit to "Seals of Private Courts or of private
Persons," which he said "are notfull Evidence by themselves without an Oath
concurring to their Credibility.". 2
The same usage of "full" occurs in Gilbert's discussion of testimonial
evidence: "[E]very plain and honest Man affirming the Truth of any Matter
under the Sanction and Solemnities of an Oath, is intitled to Faith and Credit,
so that under such Attestation the Fact is understood to be fully proved.""' 3 Yet
this "full" proof could certainly be refuted or impeached: there might be
contrary witnesses greater in number; or one with a clearer memory; or one
with "more plain and evident Marks and Signs of his Knowledge";11 4 or the
contrary might be shown by a copy of a document under public seal (which
would be entitled to "greater" or "higher" credit), or under the Broad Seal
(which would be "the highest Evidence that the Nature of the Thing is capable
of')."5
Thus, Gilbert used the adjective "full"-and even the phrase, "Faith and
Credit, so that ... the Fact is understood to be fully proved"-to denote
evidentiary sufficiency: the adequacy of certain evidence, without more, to
establish a fact prima facie so as to shift the burden of proof, but not to
preclude a contrary showing. Consequently, given the commonplace usage of
the words at that time, "full faith and credit" was a very apt phrase for alluding
to the prima facie evidence rule long employed by the common law courts -
first with regard to determinations by England's "inferior" courts not-of-
record, and later with regard to judgments from the colonies and elsewhere
outside the realm.
Indeed, the committee draft from which the "full faith and credit"
provision in the finished Articles of Confederation derived actually specified
iii. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). With the same import, but using yet another word, Gilbert said
that "things under [public] Seal are supposed to have an intrinsic Credit," whereas writings
not under public seal "have no intrinsic Credit in themselves .... they have no Credit but
what they derive from something else, viz. from the Oath of the Person who attests them, or
from some Presumption in their Favour." Id. at 18-19.
11. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Again, just like "the seals of the King, and of the Publick Courts
of Justice, Time out of Mind," so also "the Seal of a Court created by Act of Parliament, is of
full Credit without further Attestation, for the Act of Parliament is of the same Notoriety
with the Common Law, and therefore the Court, and the Seals thereby created, are
supposed universally known to every Body." Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 142.
114. Id. at 1S8.
115. See id. at 15.
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that "an Action of Debt may lie in the Court of Law in any State for the
Recovery of a Debt due on Judgment of any Court in any other State.",,, 6 No
surviving notes explain why this additional language in the committee draft
was stricken before final approval -a circumstance that has occasioned some
conjecture ' 7 - but since an action of debt (or of indebitatus assumpsit) treating a
prior judgment as a debt (or implied undertaking) had long been the
procedure in which the prima facie rule was applied, the extra verbiage may
well have been deemed surplusage, and its specification of "an action of debt"
deemed too restrictive for states preferring indebitatus assumpsit. In any event,
there is nothing whatsoever to suggest any attempt to repudiate the long-
established prima facie evidence rule by stealth maneuver.
Moreover, persuasive reasons exist for rejecting the suggestion that the
"full faith and credit" mandate of the Articles of Confederation contemplated
anything like interstate res judicata. First, when the Articles were drafted and
approved, the American Revolution was still being fought and the states were
heady with their newly seized independence. They were parsimonious in
yielding power, and took care to articulate that "[e]ach state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and
right" not "expressly delegated."' 1 8 Those Articles did not contemplate the
"more perfect Union""' 9 that another decade of hard experience would
persuade Americans to prefer. It would have been incongruous for the states to
impose any greater constraints on their separate judicial systems than were
already familiar.2
Second, and even more persuasive, when the Articles of Confederation
came into force in 1781, and before the "full faith and credit" provision had
been litigated in any court, the Continental Congress appointed a committee to
report on the implementation and possible improvement of those Articles. The
committee's report dated August 22, 1781, included two recommendations
regarding the full faith and credit provision. The report stated that there was
need, first, for "declaring the method of exemplifying records," and second, for
116. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 887 (1907).
117. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 35-36; Radin, supra note 46, at 5-7; Ross, supra note
102, at 141-42; Whitten, State Choice of Law, supra note 1o8, at 25-29.
118. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. II.
119. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
120. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note io8, at 541 ("[I]t seems unlikely that the
draftsmen of the Articles would have been willing to prescribe a conclusive effect on the
merits for sister state judgments, given their general desire to preserve state autonomy.").
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"declaring... the operation of the Acts and judicial proceedings of the Courts
of one State contravening those of the States in which they are asserted.""'
The first of these needs -coping with the Olive v. Gwin problem of the
authenticity and accuracy of foreign seals -had been addressed earlier by the
Maryland and South Carolina enactments, and then by the 1774 Massachusetts
Bay act. 2 ' The second need, however, had never been addressed prior to the
1774 Massachusetts Bay act. So far as appears, the 1774 Massachusetts Bay act
was the first attempt to go beyond any evidentiary issues and address the
question of sister-colony effect. It said that a duly authenticated sister-colony
judgment was not only to be "good and sufficient evidence of such judgment,"
but also was to "have the same effect and operation, as if the original judgment
and proceedings had been rendered and had in the court where such action of
debt shall be brought and depending.' 12 3 In other words, Massachusetts courts
would have to apply Massachusetts preclusion rules to duly authenticated
sister-colony judgments, rather than any different preclusion rules applicable
in the jurisdiction of origin. (Interestingly, the 1774 Massachusetts Bay rule
was exactly the converse of the rule prescribed under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution ever since the First Congress: that a judgment's
force in a second state is to be measured by its force in the state of its origin.'")
The 1781 Continental Congress committee did not advocate
Massachusetts's approach, nor did it propose any other. But it is significant
that this committee of the same body that had drafted and proposed the
Articles of Confederation perceived the Articles's "full faith and credit"
mandate as silent on the question of sister-state "operation," while identifying
such operation (in other words, sister-state "Effect") as a separate matter still
needing attention.
All things considered- including the usage of the words at the time-the
phrase "full faith and credit" was an appropriate way of alluding to the familiar
prima facie evidence rule, ensuring admissibility but nothing more than
evidentiary sufficiency. It also presented opportunity for confusion, however,
because similar combinations of some of the same words were sometimes used
with quite a different meaning.' Nadelmann has noted this different usage,
but overstates its significance. He asserts that "giving faith and credit" was a
121. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 894 (1912).
122. For a discussion of the colonies' attempts to address the Olive and Otway problems, see supra
text accompanying notes 77-99.
123. 5 ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 98, § 2, at 68.
124. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236-37 (19o8).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 126-136.
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"term of art" in England, "regularly recurred to in discussion of the effect to
which decisions of the ecclesiastical courts were entitled in the common law
courts. ''12 6 This is a considerable overstatement because it slights the limiting
history that made the use of these words in that ecclesiastical context quite
peculiar.
Under the religious establishment in England, ecclesiastical tribunals were
assigned exclusive jurisdiction over a number of matters, some of which- like
the lawfulness of marriages and the legitimacy of children-had important
ramifications for secular affairs. Consequently, from the eleventh century
forward, secular courts in proprietary cases requested rulings from the bishop
on these questions and adjudicated proprietary rights accordingly. This was
called "trial by certificate." '27 Over time, this deference to ecclesiastical
determinations, especially regarding marriage, degenerated to include even
prior and collateral rulings, even when the parties were not the same."' Also,
the practice ceased to be confined to proprietary actions; and it made no
difference if the ecclesiastical court had decided on grounds discountenanced
by the secular law, '29 or if it had departed from proper ecclesiastical
procedure. 3° It made no difference either that the ecclesiastical court might
126. Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 44. Whitten followed Nadelmann's lead, characterizing "faith"
and "credit" as "evidentiary terms of art." Whitten, State Choice of Law, supra note io8, at 17;
Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note io8, at 520.
127. STEPHEN, supra note 40, at 122.
128. See, e.g., Bunting v. Lepingwell, (1585) 76 Eng. Rep. 950, 952 (K.B.) (reporter's note); David
E. Engdahl, "Full Faith and Credit" in Merrie Olde England: New Insight for Marriage Conflicts
Law from the Thirteenth Century, 5 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 8 n.46 (1970) (discussing William de
Cardunville's Case, 1 CALENDARJUM GENEALOGICUM, at 57 (c. 1254)).
129. See, e.g., Case LXXXIV, (1365) 145 Eng. Rep. 33 (Exch.) ("Where the cognizance of a cause
belongs to the spiritual courts, and they give sentence in it, and express the cause of their
sentence, although this cause of the sentence be null and void in our law; yet our law
approves the sentence."); see also Caudrey's Case, (1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 1, at 8-9 (Q.B.)
(holding that, despite noncompliance with a statute, ecclesiastical deprivation of a
clergyman's benefice "was such as the Judges of the Common Law ought to allow to be
given according to the ecclesiastical laws: for seeing their authority is to proceed and give
sentence in ecclesiastical causes, according to the ecclesiastical law . . . the Judges of the
Common Law ought to give faith and credit to their sentence, and to allow it to be done
according to the ecclesiastical law").
13o. See, e.g., Grove v. Elliot, (1670) 86 Eng. Rep. 296, 298 (C.B.).
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have erred or been misled,13' or even that the ecclesiastical proceeding was
collusive. '32
Over the course of centuries, this practice was sometimes referred to as
giving "credit," '133 or "credence, 1134 or "faith and credit,"13 or simply "faith,1 36
to determinations made by ecclesiastical courts. The necessary-and
sufficient-basis of this practice, though, had been that the ecclesiastical
tribunals had exclusive jurisdiction, and the secular courts had no jurisdiction,
over the particular questions as to which the practice occurred.
As to marriage, this justification was avulsed by the secularization of
English marriage law in the mid-eighteenth century, 37 and then the practice
was radically curtailed by the House of Lords. The occasion for this curtailment
was the internationally celebrated trial of the Duchess of Kingston on a charge
of bigamy in 1776. The Duchess was convicted despite an ecclesiastical court's
earlier determination, occurring before she married the Duke, that she was a
spinster free of marital tie (notwithstanding her unfortunate, but not childless,
long-secret marriage to another in her distant youth). Her entire defense
consisted of centuries of precedent giving "faith and credit" to ecclesiastical
determinations. But after hearing four days of argument over the relevant
precedents -and on the legal advice of all twelve of the common law Justices
and Barons against her defense - the Lords voted her guilty, without dissent. 138
After that event, it might seem that no informed person -even in America,
where news of the trial circulated- could be confident that the words "faith"
and "credit" in any combination would be understood to mean conclusive
effect, or res judicata. On the other hand, the prominently publicized
131. Baker v. Rogers, (1600) 78 Eng. Rep. ioi8, 1o19 (C.B.); see also Kenn's Case, (16o6) 77 Eng.
Rep. 474, 476 (Exch.) (" [V]e will never examine the cause, whether it be true or not .....
For another example, see Noell v. Wells, (1668) 83 Eng. Rep. 385 (K.B.).
132. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Hatfield, (1725) 2 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L).
133. E.g., Jones v. Bow, (1692) 9o Eng. Rep. 735 (B.R.); Nedham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 135a, 135b,
(16io) 77 Eng. Rep. 678, 679 (C.P.); Kenn's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 476; Bunting, 76 Eng.
Rep. at 952.
134. E.g., Baker, 78 Eng. Rep. at io19; Hitcham & Glovers Case, (1618) 81 Eng. Rep. 623 (K.B.).
135. E.g., Grove, 86 Eng. Rep. at 298; Bunting, 76 Eng. Rep. at 952; Caudrey's Case, (1591) 77 Eng.
Rep. 1, 9 (0-B.).
136. The parallel text of Coke's report of Caudrey's Case, which is in Latin, uses the word "faith"
but omits "credit": "communis legis Judices ipsorum sententiae fidem adhibere eandem
approbate, juxta legem ecclesiasticam latam fuisse debent." 5 Co. Rep. la, 7a, (1591) 77 Eng.
Rep. 1, 9.
137. Clandestine Marriages Act, 1754, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (Eng.); see David E. Engdahl, The
Secularization ofEnglish Marriage Law, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 505 (1968).
138. See supra note 52.
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association of the words "faith" and "credit" with the claim of conclusive effect
for a prior tribunal's determination might have encouraged the similar
arguments that some American lawyers would soon (unsuccessfully) advance
under the Articles of Confederation.
B. Cases Under the Articles of Confederation's Full Faith and Credit Provision
The first reported case implicating the Articles of Confederation's full faith
and credit provision was Jenkins v. Putnam, an action of trover in South
Carolina for cargo from a ship condemned in a North Carolina admiralty court
and eventually sold. The South Carolina court per curiam said, "We are bound
by the sentence of the court of admiralty in North-Carolina... and are obliged
to give due faith and credit to all its proceedings. The act of confederation is
conclusive as to this point, and the law of nations, is equally strong upon it."'39
For its statement about the law of nations, the South Carolina court
appropriately cited cases illustrating the settled exception regarding foreign
admiralty decrees. Its added allusions to "the act of confederation" 4 ° and to
"due faith and credit"14' were not elaborated upon by the court. Some
advocates thereafter claimed Jenkins as authority for treating the Articles's full
faith and credit provision as a general mandate of sister-state effect, but Jenkins
remained the only case under the Articles where that view received even a
passing judicial nod - and after all, the case involved an admiralty decree.
InJames v. Allen in 1786, the debtor under a New Jersey judgment had been
sued on that judgment in Pennsylvania. He defaulted in the Pennsylvania case
before being discharged under New Jersey's Insolvent Law, and then moved to
set aside the default so he could plead the New Jersey discharge in defense to
the Pennsylvania action. Invoking the Articles's full faith and credit provision,
his attorney argued that if the New Jersey judgment "was only prima facie
evidence before, this would render it conclusive," so that "[w]hat Lord
Mansfield declares in [Walker v. Witter] to be the case with respect to certain
Courts in Westminster Hall (whose decisions and proceedings are
139. Jenkins v. Putnam, i S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 1784 WL 36 (S.C. Com. P. Gen. Sess. 1784).
14o. This presumably was a reference to the Articles of Confederation.
141. "Due" faith and credit, as distinguished from "full" faith and credit, was a formula routinely
used, for example, in notarial certifications, while "full" was the adjective used in "the act of
confederation." Thus, in contrast to arguments made in some later cases, at least the South
Carolina court did not rely upon misconstruction of the word "full."
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unexaminable evidence) is also true when applied to the several Courts of
Justice in the States of the American Union."
1 42
Plaintiffs counsel, including Jared Ingersoll,' 43 however, recalled that
unlike judgments of the common law courts at Westminster,
judgments in foreign Courts were only primafacie evidence, except in
Courts of Admiralty, whose decrees were conclusive, because founded
upon the law of nations, which is common to all the world .... That,
even if the validity of a foreign proceeding is admitted, a right to
examine the ground, upon which it was founded, remains.144
Agreeing with plaintiff's counsel, the Pennsylvania court said,
The Articles of Confederation, which direct that full faith and credit
shall be given in one State to the Records, Acts, and judicial
proceedings, of the others, will not admit of the construction
contended for [on behalf of the debtor] ... but seem chiefly intended
to oblige each State to receive the records of another as full evidence of
such Acts and judicial proceedings.'45
Note that in this case, the Pennsylvania court used the word "full" exactly as
Gilbert had used it,' 4 6 denoting evidentiary sufficiency in contrast to conclusive
effect.
The same year, the Superior Court in Connecticut in Kibbe v. Kibbe issued a
one sentence per curiam opinion upholding a demurrer to a claim of debt on a
Massachusetts default judgment.147 The judgment was for alleged breach of a
covenant of title to Massachusetts land that the defendant had conveyed to the
plaintiff. The Connecticut court held that since the defendant had not been
served in Massachusetts, that state "had no legal jurisdiction of the cause. '148 In
dictum, however, the Connecticut court added that "full credence ought to be
given to judgments of the courts in any of the United States, where both
142. James v. Allen, 1 DalI. 188 (Pa. C.P. 1786).
143. Ingersoll was reputed to be the "ablest jury lawyer in Philadelphia." MAX FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (1913).
144. 1 Dall. at 19o.
145. Id. at 191-92 (emphasis added).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115.
147. 1 Kirby 119, 119, 126 (Conn. 1786).
148. Id.
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parties are within the jurisdiction of such courts ... and are duly served with
the process, and have or might have had a fair trial of the cause."' 4 9 Judge Dyer
agreed with the holding, but the dictum prompted him to say more: "the
original action was upon a covenant real, and [thus] locally annexed where the
lands lie [in Massachusetts]; and the judgment being by default, this
[Connecticut] court never could take cognizance of or examine into the justice
of the cause" -an examination that application of the prima facie rule would
have required. Being thus unable to afford the defendant the requisite
opportunity to rebut the prima facie showing, Judge Dyer reasoned that even if
there had been sufficient service in Massachusetts, the Connecticut court
"cannot enforce the judgment on which this action is brought."' ' ° Judge Dyer's
point was that the prima facie rule itself would operate to preclude interstate
res judicata, even if Massachusetts had jurisdiction.
In 1788, a few months after the Constitutional Convention but while the
Articles of Confederation still were in force, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided two other relevant cases. In the first one, Millar v. Hall, s' Jared
Ingersoll - having earlier vindicated the prima facie rule in James v. Allen - this
time represented a debtor discharged under Maryland's insolvent law but
whose obligations scheduled in the Maryland proceeding had not included the
obligation to which the Pennsylvania suit pertained. All of the client's assets,
however, had been surrendered in the Maryland proceeding for the benefit of
the creditors who were scheduled there; the only recourse available to the
debtor's Pennsylvania creditor was to seek the debtor's imprisonment on the
Pennsylvania debt.
Ingersoll sought to relieve his client not of the obligation, but only of the
imprisonment sanction. Among his several arguments were some based on
English law writers, on "general principles," and on "positive authorities" of
different countries; he also argued "the reason of the thing" and "the
mischievous consequences of a contrary position," and included an argument
from the Pennsylvania constitution."s2 Most relevant for our purposes,
Ingersoll urged giving effect to the Maryland discharge under the full faith and
credit provision (and the free ingress and regress and privileges and
149. Id. The court's brief opinion did not explain what this dictum contemplated as "full
credence," but once latter-day preconceptions are laid aside, those words are quite suitable
for alluding to the traditional prima facie rule.
1so. Id. at 126 (opinion of Dyer, J.).
151. 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788).
152. Id. at 231.
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immunities provisions) of Article TV of the Articles of Confederation. l"3 The
Pennsylvania court granted the relief that Ingersoll sought for his client, and
the opinion recites that the court had "considered ... the reciprocal obligation
of the states under the articles of confederation."' 5 4 The court declined to
explicate that obligation, however, and did not base its holding on that ground.
Instead, while denying the Maryland act any extra-territorial "coercive
operation," the court said it acted "upon equitable grounds, for general and just
purposes," and grounded its decision on considerations of "general
conveniency, expediency, justice, and humanity" and on "the general principles
ofjustice."'
Three months later, in Phelps v. Holker, '56 Ingersoll appeared in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again, this time representing a creditor suing
on a Massachusetts default judgment for money. The defendant, a
Pennsylvanian, sought to defeat the prima facie force of the Massachusetts
judgment by challenging the "justice" of the Massachusetts proceeding, which
had been commenced without notice by attachment of a blanket allegedly his.
(This procedure complied with Massachusetts law, and the Articles of
Confederation contained no restriction resembling our Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.) This time, Ingersoll conceded that the prima facie rule
would have applied if a foreign judgment had been at issue, but he insisted that
the Massachusetts judgment "cannot be considered as a foreign judgment, for,
it is the record of a Court of one of the States of the Union, and, as such, it is
entitled to fullfaith and credit in each of them.1 5 7
Having attended the Constitutional Convention, which had ended just six
months before, Ingersoll surely remembered the steps taken there to empower
the proposed new Congress to prescribe sister-state effect.' ss But for the time
being, the Articles still were in force, and Ingersoll had a client to serve. Thus,
arguing that the Articles of Confederation's "design must certainly have been
to form a stronger cement, than that by which the States themselves [when
colonies] were hitherto connected, or by which they are, at this day, connected
with other nations," the resourceful advocate seized upon the full faith and
credit provision's use of the word "record," arguing that "[t]he very term
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 232.
156. 1 Dall. 261 (Pa. 1788).
157. Id. at 261.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 173-204 (detailing these relevant steps at the
Constitutional Convention).
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Record must be conclusive; for what is a record in one State, by this article,
becomes such in every State, and it is the nature of a record to preclude every
idea of scrutiny and contradiction."s 9
Ingersoll's opponent, however, maintained that "[j]udgments given in one
State, are not made obligatory upon the Courts of another, by the Articles of
Confederation; which only provide, that, in matters of evidence, mutual faith
and credit shall be given to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the
States.,,,60 This was the argument that prevailed. As the Chief Justice said,
"[T] he Judgment obtained in Massachusetts cannot be considered as conclusive
evidence of the debt, and, therefore, the Defendant ought still to be at liberty to
controvert and deny it.,1 6
Thus, the sum of the cases under the Articles's full faith and credit
provision was that-except as to admiralty decrees, which England's own
common law courts regarded as conclusive -American state courts under the
Articles of Confederation treated sister-state judgments the same as England's
common law courts had long treated judgments of foreign, colonial, and
England's own "inferior" courts. That is, they took them as "full" evidence,
sufficient to meet the prima facie standard, but not as conclusive or binding.
Instead, they remained controvertible.1
6
,
At the same time, the meaning of the Articles of Confederation's faith and
credit mandate remained in some dispute. Ingersoll's practice nicely illustrates
the range of arguments being seriously advanced. The fact of such forensic
disharmony helps to explain James Madison's observation- made after the
foregoing South Carolina and Connecticut cases and the first one or two of
those in Pennsylvania- that the meaning of the Articles's faith and credit
provision was "extremely indeterminate.",6 Madison's observation was surely
well founded, regardless of whether, in the decade after independence, the
problems illustrated by the Olive and Otway cases 64 had been sufficiently
159. 1 DalI. at 263.
160. Id. at 261-62.
161. Id. at 264.
162. Further evidence that "full faith and credit" was typically understood during the
Confederation period to import authenticity and evidentiary sufficiency without precluding
further inquiry is a 1786 Delaware statute, discussed in Sachs, supra note 32 (manuscript at
19). The Delaware statute ordained that instruments bearing the seal of the Bank of North
America "shall have full Faith and Credit in all and every the Courts within this State." Id.
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 287.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 77-99.
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obviated that the Articles's provision became "of little importance under any
interpretation which it will bear.1
6
,
III."FULL FAITH AND CREDIT" p AND "EFFECT" IN DRAFTING THE
CONSTITUTION
Previous scholars seeking to illuminate the Full Faith and Credit Clause
have made forays into surviving records of the Constitutional Convention, but
their efforts have shed little light. This is not a task to be done by scanning
Madison's notes like a prosecutor adept only at proving facts by confession; the
evidence is much harder to come by. One must begin with a clear
understanding of the relevant legal background, both in England and in
pre-1787 America, and then carefully trace each step in developing the text of
the Full Faith and Clause through successive reports and motions, attentively
considering the evident concerns of those Constitutional Convention delegates
whose comments were deemed significant enough at the time for Madison or
others to record. Thus, while the account presented in this Article makes
reference to some already familiar data, it discovers new meaning -both in that
data and in data overlooked heretofore.
Of such little importance did Madison and his fellow Virginians consider
the Articles of Confederation's full faith and credit provision that when they
drew up the Resolutions used to begin deliberations at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention, 166 they included no provision resembling it. Young Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina offered a plan of his own 6 7 that did include such a
provision, which he characterized as "formed exactly upon the principles of'
the Articles's provision;16 8 but Pinckney's plan as a whole was never brought
up for discussion, so its influence was piecemeal.
165. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 287.
166. See FARRAND, supra note 143, at 68 ("Internal evidence shows much of Madison's handiwork
in forming these resolutions, but from the fact that they were presented by Randolph they
were commonly referred to as the Randolph Resolutions ... "). The Resolutions were
introduced at the beginning of the Convention, on May 29, 1787. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND,
RECORDS] (Madison).
167. 1 FARRAND, RECORDs, supra note 166, at 23 (Madison).
168. See Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal
Convention in Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, in 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166,
at 1O6, 112. The document sent by Pinckney to John Quincy Adams in 1818, which Adams
published as Pinckney's in the official Journal, is not considered Pinckney's original plan.
See 3 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 501-15, 595. Paragraph 13 of the draft published
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When the Convention, after almost two months, appointed a "Committee
of Detail" to report "a Constitution conformably to the Proceedings" completed
thus far, 6 ' there still had been no discussion of sister-state "faith" or "credit."
Along with the approved Resolutions, however, Pinckney's plan was also
referred to the Committee for consideration . 7° Apparently prompted by it, the
Committee included as Article XVI in its August 6, 1787 Report that "[flull
faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the




Edmund Randolph of Virginia and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut were
members of this Committee of Detail. Both also had been members seven years
earlier of the Continental Congress's committee recommending improvements
to the Articles of Confederation. That earlier committee had reported that the
Articles's full faith and credit provision needed modification to reach the
questions of authentication and sister-state effect,172  but the Detail
Committee's proposed Article XVI, like the Articles's provision, remained silent
on both points.
On September 1, the "full faith" phrase in the Detail Committee's proposed
Article XVI provision was replaced by the longer phrase "full faith and
credit" - the same phrase appearing in the Articles of Confederation - but the
shortcomings of the Articles's provision could hardly be supplied by simply
restoring this redundancy. The Convention would address the matters of
authentication and sister-state effect later, with entirely new language
contained in a new and separate sentence. The steps by which that new
language took shape illuminate why the Full Faith and Credit Clause
eventually attained the particular phrasing that it did.
Although the issue had never been litigated, it was questionable whether
the Articles's full faith and credit provision applied to statutes. It embraced
"records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates."1 73 If the
prepositional phrase were to be read as modifying only "judicial proceedings"
rather than "records" and "acts" as well, the provision could be understood to
in the Journal, id. at 6oi, is almost identical to the clause reported by the Committee of
Detail ten weeks later; it is unknown which copied which in this particular instance.
16 9 . 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 85-87, 97 (Journal).
17o. Id. at 98 (Journal).
171. Report of the Committee of Detail, in 2 FARRAND, RECORDs, supra note 166, at 177, 188. In the
original print, this was misnumbered XV. See id. at 181 n.5.
172. See supra text accompanying note 121.
173. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. WV (emphasis added).
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reach the records and acts not only of magistrates and courts but also "acts" of
legislative assemblies (which Gilbert had included even as "records" 74).
The Detail Committee eliminated this uncertainty by proposing that "[f] ull
faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the
records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other
State. 1 7 When this Article came up for discussion on August 29, however, it
was opposed by some who apparently believed that statutes were not embraced
by the Articles's provision, and to whom their inclusion seemed problematic.
The "eccentric but good-humored"'' 6 Dr. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina
said he did not "understand precisely the meaning of the article" as reported by
the Committee, and moved to substitute instead the wording of the Articles of
Confederation provision.1 77
The Detail Committee's language ought not to have troubled those who
understood "full faith" (or "full faith and credit") as an allusion to the familiar
prima facie evidence rule. As we have seen, however, some lawyers already had
argued that the Articles's provision required giving sister-state effect; and as
long as that remained arguable, extending the rule to statutes could hardly
have failed to excite concern.
Brief reflection should indicate why. Courts were not then considered to be
makers of law or organs of public policy. Rather, courts were perceived in
Blackstonian terms as applying preexisting law to particular disputes of
particular parties on particular facts.7 8 A forum might sometimes decide
particular claims of particular parties under another sovereign's law, but this
was done as a matter of comity, or by virtue of "choice of law" precepts of the
forum itself. Moreover, because only the private interests of particular parties
174. Gilbert included under the heading of "records" not only "Letters Patent," but also "Acts of
Parliament," distinguishing these from "Public Matters that are not Records" such as the
Domesday Book, the ports survey, and the register of christenings and burials. GILBERT,
supra note 37, at 10, 76-79, 92.
175. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 188.
176. FARRAND, supra note 143, at 24.
177. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS,supra note 166, at 447 (Madison).
178. Even a few decades into the nineteenth century, after some judges had begun to take more
proactive views of their judicial role, it remained generally accurate to say that
[i]n the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are ....
The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments
promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs
having the force of laws.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
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were determined and no matter of public policy (aside from the policy of
comity itself) was involved, even an obligation to give effect to sister-state
judgments would not seriously threaten a state's sovereign independence.
In contrast, statutes were the standard means by which governments in the
Anglo-American tradition established and changed public policy and
undertook to control behavior within their geographic bounds -not merely of
parties to particular litigation but of the general population. To declare that a
forum state must credit the duly authenticated statute of a sister state as being
the law governing in that sister state was inoffensive. But to require the forum
state to give effect to a sister state's statute as the law to govern in the forum
state itself, displacing the forum's own law on point, would doubly affront the
postulate of territorial limits to governing power-enabling the one state to
govern beyond its boundaries while disabling the other state to govern within
its own.' 79
Copies of the Detail Committee's Report had been in the delegates' hands
for more than three weeks before coming up in formal deliberation, ' so the
prospect of an obligation to apply sister-state statutes already might have been
discussed at the taverns between sessions. To so unsettling a prospect, Dr.
Wilkinson's comment and accompanying motion to substitute the original
wording of the Articles of Confederation provision seems quite a temperate
response. Several commentators have noted the brief ensuing dialogue
regarding insolvency acts,' 8' but that fails to explain the level of concern that
179. Cf. Ala. Packers Ass'n. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (containing
Justice Stone's famous argument against the "absurd result" that "the statute of each state
must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own"). Whereas Justice
Stone inferred that it was therefore "unavoidable that this Court determine for itself the
extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute
of another," id., this Article argues that the Framers at Philadelphia deliberately left this
quandary for solution by the states severally, subject only to Congress's political control
with no oversight role for the federal judiciary at all.
i8o. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 176 (Journal).
181. According to Madison's notes, James Wilson (who was a member of the Committee of
Detail) and Connecticut's William Samuel Johnson (who was not) answered Williamson by
saying they supposed this was to include insolvency acts -"private" acts of state legislatures
for relief of individual debtors. 2 FARRAND, REcORDs, supra note 166, at 447. Recall that
some of the cases litigated under the Articles's "full faith and credit" provision had involved
insolvency acts.
Immediately after these comments, however, Mr. Pinckney proposed adding power for
the national legislature to "establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies," id. at
445 (Journal); id. at 447-48 (Madison), and eventually that proposal was approved with
scant opposition, id. at 486 (Journal); id. at 489 (Madison). Moreover, Gouverneur Morris
promptly proposed replacing "acts of the Legislatures" with the broader phrase "public
1622
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the Detail Committee's proposal aroused with respect to statutes- and worse, it
obscures the importance of what occurred next.
Virginia's Governor Edmund Randolph, a member of the Detail
Committee (and previously a member of the 1781 Continental Congress
committee which had reported that words in addition to "full faith and credit"
were requisite should a rule for sister-state effect be desired) seems not to have
realized until Dr. Williamson's query that some could take the "full faith and
credit" phrase by itself to mean giving sister-state effect. But now that the
question of sister-state effect had been opened and the specter of
extraterritorial application of statutes had emerged, Governor Randolph hastily
prepared a rather long and ungainly motion, the import of which has been
ignored by scholars. In addition to providing for authentication by
exemplification under the originating state's seal, Governor Randolph's motion
proposed as a rule for the sister-state effect of any state act, "whether legislative
executive or judiciary," that its "operation shall be binding in every other State,
in all cases to which it may relate, and which are within the cognizance and
jurisdiction of the State, wherein the said act was done. , 82 This went beyond
the prima facie evidence rule explicitly to mandate conclusive effect
("operation... binding in every other State")-but only within the limits of
"cognizance and jurisdiction," which as to statutes (certainly at that time)
would mean the territorial limits of the enacting state. 8 '
I In response, Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania proposed a simpler
expedient: simply punting the ball. Morris moved that the task of determining
not only the proof, but also "the ... effect of such acts, records, and
proceedings," be left to the national legislature.' He proposed that "[flull
faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature shall by general laws
determine the Proof and effect of such acts, records, and proceedings. ' s This
proposal by Morris was the original form of what eventually would become the
second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
For a reason that will later prove important, it should be noted that the
provision took this form specifically in contemplation of the complicating
concerns over jurisdiction and state policy that had worried Dr. Williamson
afts," id. at 445 (Journal); id. at 448 (Madison), which would render irrelevant any allusion
to insolvency acts. Morris's broader phrase was adopted by the Committee and eventually
approved. Id. at 445, 486 (Journal); id. at 489 (Madison).
182. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 445 (Journal); id. at 448 (Madison).
183. Id. at 445 (Journal).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 448 (Madison).
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and Governor Randolph, and that the "Effect" it addressed was explicitly and
unambiguously the "effect of such acts, records, and proceedings"- not the
effect of such "manner of proof' as the legislature might determine. It should
also be noted that Morris's motion plainly contemplated that the sister-state
"effect of such acts, records, and proceedings" was appropriate for
determination in the national legislature (where experience and practical
considerations could be taken into account), rather than for a priori
rigidification by constitutional command.'86
Both Governor Randolph's and Gouverneur Morris's proposals were
committed to a special committee of five, along with the proposal from the
Committee of Detail. When this special committee (four members of which -
including Wilson and Randolph-had been on the Committee of Detail 8 7)
reported three days later,' 88 it had followed Morris's proposal in replacing the
phrase "acts of the Legislatures" with "public Acts," but it had only partially
followed Morris's proposal to punt the complicating considerations to the
legislature. Morris had proposed punting the questions of both proof and effect
regarding all three categories ("public acts, records, and judicial proceedings")
to the legislature. The committee of five instead proposed requiring the
legislature to prescribe the manner of proof for all three, but to prescribe sister-
state effect as to judgments only- conspicuously omitting any provision
regarding sister-state effect for "public acts." Their wording was that "the
Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which Judgments
obtained in one State, shall have in another."' 8 This would have left the
sister-state effect of "public acts" (as well as of any "records" other than
judgments) unspecified in the Constitution but not delegated to Congress, and
therefore determinable by the several states each resolving for itself the
questions of jurisdiction and public policy involved.
When this proposal of the committee of five came up for discussion on
September 3, Morris moved to amend it by replacing everything following the
word "Effect" with the single word "thereof.""' That would bring the
186. Id. at 445 (Journal).
187. Id. The other members were John Rutledge of South Carolina and Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts, who also had served on the Committee of Detail, and William Samuel
Johnson of Connecticut, who had not. This committee of five was also to consider some
other issues raised the same day.
188. Id. at 484-85 (Madison).
189. Id. at 485 (Madison).
19o. Id. at 488 (Madison) ("[T]he Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.").
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committee's proposal into conformity with the substance of his own motion of
August 29. Morris's new motion, however, triggered responses from three
members of the committee of five.'9
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, evidently in opposition,
9 2
highlighted the problem by pointing out that Morris's amendment "would
authorize the Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one
State, in another State." '93 Randolph spoke out with considerably more vigor.
Five days earlier he had remarked on the anomaly of one state exercising
authority within another, 94 and overall he had grown very uneasy with the
breadth of national legislative competence countenanced by the delegates thus
far. In Morris's latest motion, Randolph saw the portent of still further
usurpation of state authority, since the word "shall" required the national
legislature to prescribe giving effect-within each state's own territory, and
notwithstanding its own public policy-to the statutes of other states.
Randolph believed this went much too far, and (according to Madison's notes)
Randolph denounced Morris's proposal as
strengthening the general objection agst. the plan, that its definition of
the powers of the Government was so loose as to give it opportunities
of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going farther than the
191. Id. at 488-89 (Madison). There is no reason to suppose that Morris (or anyone else)
conceived the word "thereof' as referring to the manner of proof, rather than to "acts,
Records, & proceedings." The effect of "acts, Records, & proceedings" had been the whole
point of dispute between Morris's earlier motion and the more limited proposal of the
committee of five.
192. Id. at 488 (Madison). Madison did not specify whether Johnson spoke for or against
Morris's motion. One must infer his position from the fact that he was on the committee of
five that now was advancing a proposal contrary to Morris's. If this is true, the discussions
in committee might have changed Johnson's view from what it seems to have been on
August 29, when he and Wilson responded to Dr. Wilkinson's query about the Detail
Committee's proposed "full faith" clause embracing "acts of the Legislature."
Madison also reports a comment by Colonel Mason of Virginia, which makes little sense
as Madison reports it. Madison says Mason "favored" Morris's motion "particularly if the
'effect' was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings." Id. at 488. The purpose of
Morris's motion, however, was to eliminate that restraint. Perhaps Madison got Mason's
comment out of sequence, as it had been made before Morris's motion; or perhaps Madison
mistook Mason's position, as Mason had actually spoken for the Committee's proposal
instead of for Morris's.
193. Id. at 488 (Madison).
194. Id. at 448 (Madison).
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Report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of
Judgments.'9s
James Wilson was the third member of the committee of five responding to
Morris's September 3 motion. As to judgments, Wilson observed that unless
the national legislature were authorized to "declare the effect," the nascent "full
faith and credit" clause "would amount to nothing more than what now takes
place among all Independent Nations", 6-an allusion to the prima facie
evidence rule that was accurate at the time as to nations (like ours, and like
Wilson's native Scotland) that followed the common law, but not as to the
practice of some other countries. Wilson's point was that, without the second
sentence's grant of power to the legislature, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
would remain simply a prima facie evidence rule - as the court in Wilson's own
Pennsylvania had held the full faith and credit provision in the Articles of
Confederation to be.' 97 That was why Wilson and the rest of the committee of
five, seeking to improve upon the Articles of Confederation, had followed
Morris so far as to empower the national legislature to prescribe sister-state
"effect," albeit only for judgments.
Morris, however, wanted more. He wanted the effect of sister-state
statutes, no less than of judgments, to be prescribed by the national legislature
rather than determined severally by the states. Remember that at this stage of
the Constitution's drafting, the wording of what would become the second
sentence of the Clause was still mandatory: "[T]he Legislature shall by general
laws prescribe." Morris's motion therefore meant the legislature would be
mandated to prescribe rules regarding sister-state effect as well as
authentication or proof, and regarding statutes as well as "[r]ecords &
proceedings." Anyone cognizant of Randolph's concern would have
understood that, whatever might be the particular rule prescribed for sister-
state effect, there definitely would be some displacement-or "usurping," to
use Randolph's word-of the states' sovereign power to determine the law and
public policy applicable within their respective bounds.
Morris's motion nonetheless passed six states to three.'9 s Madison
thereupon moved to change the word "shall" in the second sentence to
195. Id. at 488-89 (Madison).
196. Id. at 488 (Madison).
197. Phelps v. Holker, 1 DalI. 261 (Pa. 1788).
198. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 486 (Journal); id: at 489 (Madison).
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"may."' 99 This plainly would tend-and from its timing, seems to have been
designed- to mollify Randolph's concern by making it explicit that Congress
need not engage in the overreaching that Randolph feared, but would have
discretion to distinguish, for example, between the sister-state effect of
judgments and any sister-state effect of "public Acts." Madison's motion, in
other words, seems to have been calculated to accommodate such concerns as
Randolph had expressed, while still affording Congress ample power to
mandate such sister-state effects as the lawmakers' judgment, conditioned by
the nation's experience and its changing needs from time to time, might advise.
With regard to Randolph's "usurpation" concern, E.S. Corwin remarked in
1933 that "the objection went unheeded."2 00 It appears to the contrary,
however, that Randolph's fear of usurpation of state sovereignty precipitated
Madison's extremely important amendment. Morris's motion had been hotly
debated and had passed with a third of the states still opposed; but Madison's
amendment seems to have satisfied all, for no one opposed it, and the entire
clause as so amended was approved "witht. a count of Sts."2"' With this, except
for some nonsubstantive changes made later by the Committee of Style,2"' the
Full Faith and Credit Clause attained its final form.
The new, second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a grant of
legislative power to Congress, and legislative power imports discretion. On its
face, the discretion so granted over proof and effect is as plenary within the
terms of the grant as is, for example, the discretion given Congress over
"Commerce... among the several States." ' 3 The word "may" in the second
sentence imports discretion, both as to what and as to whether Congress
should prescribe. General laws regarding authentication procedures might
seem useful, or they might seem unnecessary; the question of whether to
prescribe them, and whether to make them the same for "public Acts" as for
judicial records, might turn on practical considerations best left for the
Congress to. assess. Madison evidently thought the same as to sister-state
effect. His amendment thus empowered Congress, following its own
judgment, to fashion whatever "general Laws"20 4 it deemed advisable about
199. Id. at 486 (Journal); id. at 489 (Madison). The same motion changed the word "may" in the
first sentence of the draft clause to "shall." See infra text accompanying notes 214-215.
zoo. Edward S. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 371, 388 (1933).
201. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 166, at 489 (Madison); see id. at 486 (Journal).
2o. For the Report of the Committee of Style, see id. at 590-603. For discussion of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, see id. at 6oi.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
204. To construe this "general Laws" requirement as precluding subject-matter specificity, rather
than as contemplating nationwide applicability, would serve no purpose identifiable with
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either of the two matters addressed in the new sentence (that is, "proof' and
"Effect"), and with respect to any (or none) of the three specified categories
("public Acts," "Records," and "judicial Proceedings"). Congress was thus
given discretion to decide these matters sooner or later, if at all, and to change
its mind as well.
This plenary discretion was surely not meant to invite whimsy. It reflects a
practical understanding that not only the methods of authentication, but also
the effects to be imposed on sister-states, might need to differ for different sorts
of state actions, and that an undiscriminating mandate at the constitutional
level might prove to be dysfunctional or at least unwise. Granting this
discretion to Congress enabled it to accommodate whatever competing
considerations it might deem appropriate. Thus, by its choice of prescription,
Congress could facilitate interstate cooperation and integration when and
wherein its practical wisdom might suggest and its public accountability might
allow.
This "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment"2 to Congress of
discretion to prescribe sister-state effect is explicit and unequivocal. "Textual
commitments" much more equivocal than this have been held to render
questions nonjusticiable.2°6
Some scholars have argued that this congressional power to prescribe
sister-state effect is far more limited, however. Laurence Tribe, for example, in
a 1996 letter denying Congress's power to enact the so-called Defense of
Marriage Act, analogized Congress's power regarding sister-state effect to the
"one-way ratchet" operation of Congress's enforcement power under certain
constitutional amendments . 7 Senator Edward Kennedy inserted Tribe's letter
into the Congressional Record,2"s and Tribe repeated the thesis in the third
edition of his American Constitutional Law treatise in 2000.209 Meanwhile, Larry
Kramer had elaborated upon the supposed analogy in a 1997 article, arguing
that Congress could "not undermine or abolish," but could only "implement
concerns aired at the Convention and would severely curtail the discretion the surviving
records indicate the delegates intended to ensure.
os. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
206. E.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX,
cl. 2; id. amend. XXIII, 5 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, 5 2.
208. 142 CONG. REC. 13,359 (1996) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard
Law Sch., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator (May 24, 1996)).
209. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1247 n.49 (3d ed. 2000).
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and facilitate," the replication rule he attributed to the constitutional Clause
itself.21°
The Enforcement Clauses, however, were deliberately patterned after the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 1' and both it and they are specifically written in
explicitly telic2 2 terms. In contrast, nothing on the face of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause even remotely suggests that the power it gives to Congress might
be similarly confined. Indeed, not even the proponents of this restrictive view
apply it to the other matter that precisely the same words place in Congress's
untrammeled discretion: "[T]he Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved ... ""'
Other commentators have opined on what Madison's September 3 motion
accomplished in the first sentence of the pending draft of the Clause: changing
its permissive "may" to "shall," so as to provide that "full faith and credit shall
be given."2 1 4 But that part of Madison's motion simply restored the mandatory
"shall" to the very same place it had occupied in the Article of Confederation's
provision. x As the Confederation Congress's own committee had observed
(and as the case decisions had confirmed), the Articles of Confederation had
left the question of sister-state effect completely unaddressed. That is why the
mandatory requirement of "full faith and credit" under the Articles had not
displaced the prima facie rule. That part of Madison's motion, therefore,
accomplished nothing new or remarkable at all.
In contrast, no previous commentator has ackndwledged the very great
significance of the change that Madison's motion made in the second sentence
of the Clause: the change from the mandatory "shall" to the discretionary
authority "the Legislature may... prescribe." When this change has been
noted at all, its full significance has not been acknowledged. Gillian E. Metzger,
for example, noted this change. Accepting the modern orthodox view that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause itself mandates sister-state effect, however, she
210. Kramer, supra note 21, at 2003, 2004.
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
212. "Telic" derives from the Greek telos, meaning "end." The term denotes the "means-to-end"
essence of the Necessary and Proper Clause (and its Enforcement Clause analogues): power
"for carrying into Execution" other enumerated powers (or "to enforce" constitutional
protections).
213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
214. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 12, at 292 (stating that "[t]he effect of Madison's amendment
was to make the clause self-executing"- meaning, to Laycock, self-executing as to sister-
state effect).
215. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. IV, para. 3 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in
each of these states ....").
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assumed that the second sentence gave Congress only subordinate - rather than
exclusive- discretion regarding whether and how far to mandate sister-state
effect.216
IV.THE FIRST CONGRESS AND SISTER-STATE EFFECT
In several respects, when the First Congress exerted its power under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in 1790, it demonstrated deliberate exercise of the
discretion conferred upon it. By choosing whether and how to deal with
various matters at that time, it created legislative precedent for treating its
discretion in this regard as untrammeled. The 179o Act stated,
That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be
authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed
thereto: That the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any
state, shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United
States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court
annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief
justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said
attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial
proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are
or shall be taken.21 7
The first sentence of the Act addressed authentication or proof, and Congress,
in its discretion, tailored two different methods. The first clause of the
sentence, dealing with "the acts of the legislatures of the several states,"
provided that they "shall be authenticated by having the seal of their respective
states affixed thereto." The second clause prescribed a much more elaborate,
three-step process of attestation, seal, and certification by which "records and
judicial proceedings of the courts of any state" "shall be proved or admitted ' 218
16. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1468,
1497-98 (2007). See also the commentary of Douglas Laycock, whose error inheres in the
orthodox fallacy that a mandate for sister-state effect is "what the constitutional text plainly
says." Laycock, supra note 12, at 293.
217. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122 (emphasis added).
218. Unlike in the first main clause, here the word "authenticated" was not used. The second
sentence of the Act, however, referred to "records and judicial proceedings authenticated as"
specified in the first sentence - showing that the different terms were used as equivalents. Id.
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in "any other court within the United States." The difference was not
whimsical; it responded to different needs. 19
That second clause of the Act's first sentence shows the exercise of
discretion in another respect as well. From the immediate juxtaposition of
adjective and noun, it is plain that the only "proceedings" contemplated by that
clause of the statute were "judicial" ones. The noun "records" was separated
from the adjective "judicial" by a conjunction, however, making it
grammatically possible to argue that nonjudicial "records," as well as judicial
ones, were embraced. But grammar cannot control apart from context; taking
the statute's second clause as a whole, one is driven to conclude that this
second clause contemplated only judicial "records." The clause required
attestation by a court's clerk, with a court's seal, and certification by "the judge,
chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be"; the entire clause
applied only to proving such records "in any other court"; and in its final
phrase ("whence the said records are or shall be taken"), the single word
"records" was used to embrace all of "said records and judicial proceedings
authenticated as aforesaid."2 '
The contextual factors constraining the meaning of "records" in that clause
of the statute, however, are absent from the Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause. While earlier legal usage could impose a similar constraint on
the meaning of records in the constitutional provision, 2 1 in common discourse
by the late eighteenth century that term was usually taken to include
nonjudicial "records" as well. Yet it was not until 1804 that Congress passed an
Act prescribing either proof or effect for nonjudicial "records."2"' Thus, by
dealing in 1790 with only some of the "records" it regarded as embraced by the
Clause, and waiting to deal with others until 1804, Congress again exercised
the discretion deliberately conferred upon it by the second sentence of the
Clause.
219. Justice Washington explained later at circuit why the less elaborate process could suffice to
authenticate legislative acts: "The seal [of a state] is in itself, the highest test of authenticity;
and leaving the evidence upon that alone, precludes all controversy, as to the officer entitled
to affix the seal, which is a regulation very different in the different states." United States v.
Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 416 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 18o6).
22o. See supra text accompanying note 217.
221. Lord Chief Justice Coke had limited "records" to the rolls containing the pleadings and
associated rulings in England's few "courts of record." 1 CoKE, supra note 36, § 175, 2 id.
§ 438. While Gilbert had stretched the word to include letters patent and acts of parliament,
he had explicitly excluded such public archives as the Domesday Book, the ports survey, and
the register of christenings and burials. See GILBERT, supra note 37, at 76-79.
222. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298, 289-99.
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Regarding the "Effect" to be given, the second sentence of the 1790 Act
required that "records and judicial proceedings authenticated as" the first
sentence specified must be given "such faith and credit... as they have by law
or usage in the courts from whence the said records are or shall be taken." The
Clause, of course, mandates that "full faith and credit" be given "in each State"
without limiting the obligation to particular departments or branches; and
Congress could have been just as comprehensive in prescribing sister-state
"effect." Instead, the 1790 Act prescribed only the effect to be given by "every
court." In this respect, too, Congress went further in its 1804 Act, stating that
the nonjudicial records first embraced in that year "shall have such faith and
credit given to them in every court and office within the United States, as they
have by law or usage in the courts or offices of the state from whence the same
are, or shall be taken." '223 Again, the critical point is that the First Congress
exercised its discretion by doing less than the Full Faith and Credit Clause made
it competent to do.
The most conspicuous example of Congress's exercise of its discretion to
prescribe less sister-state effect than it has power to prescribe is the First
Congress's decision against prescribing any sister-state effect for "public Acts."
(Indeed, no subsequent Congress decided otherwise for over a century and a
half." 4) Some members of the First Congress had participated at the recent
Constitutional Convention, and must have been aware of the objections raised
there regarding sister-state effect for state statutes. It cannot have been
inadvertent that, while prescribing how to authenticate the "public Acts" of one
state in another, Congress kept conspicuously silent about their sister-state
effect. It was instead a deliberate exercise of Congress's discretion to leave the
question of sister-state effect for statutes untouched. This left the states free to
determine how far (if at all) to give effect to sister-state laws, based on their
respective conceptions of comity and such choice of law rules as each might
elect to apply.
223. Id. at 299. At the same time, the 1804 Act employed the same "such faith and credit.., as"
construction that was used in the 179o Act-even though the 1804 Act dealt only with
records and books "not appertaining to a court," and prescribed such faith and credit as
were given in nonjudicial "offices" in the state of origin. Id. at 298. While nonjudicial
records and books might indeed serve as evidence, either in or out of court, the nonjudicial
"offices" of their origin would not have "adjudicated" them; they could not have res judicata
effect, either at their origin or elsewhere. It thus seems apparent that, in this instance at
least, the phrase "faith and credit" was being used and understood to import nothing more
than credibility and sufficiency as evidence, and not incontestable conclusiveness.
224. No act of Congress undertook to prescribe sister-state effect for statutes before the Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)).
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This deliberate omission of any congressional directive regarding the sister-
state effect of statutes was not supplied even by the 1804 Act. By then, the
nation had gained experience in practical aspects of governing territory outside
the boundaries of any state, including some issues similar to those that the
179o Act had addressed regarding states. Accordingly, Congress prescribed that
all the provisions of this [1804] act, and the [1790] act to which this is
a supplement, shall apply as well to the public acts, records, office
books, judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the respective
territories of the United States, and countries subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, as to the public acts, records, office
books, judicial proceedings, courts and offices of the several states.22
Notably, there still was no mention of any effect that "public acts" must be
given. This 1804 language simply made the 1790 Act and the other 1804
provisions applicable for the territories "as well." While the latter prescribed
the effect to be given to territorial "records, office books, and judicial
proceedings," nowhere did either Act prescribe any effect for "public acts."
By far the most important feature of the 179o Act's second sentence,
however, was its use of the adjectival phrase "such... as." The Clause itself
specified "full" faith and credit, but the 179o Act prescribed "such faith and
credit... as" was had in the forum of origin. The two expressions crucially
differ in meaning. The key is not the "faith and credit" phrase itself, but the
choice of adjectives used with that phrase.
As already shown, "full" was in common use at that time with reference to
the sufficiency of evidence to constitute prima facie proof. That is how courts
applying the "full" faith and credit provision of the Articles of Confederation
had construed it. Arguments that "full" in the Articles's provision meant
"conclusive" had been judicially rejected. No evidence has ever been offered to
suggest that those who framed the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause
contemplated a different meaning for the phrase "full faith and credit" than it
had carried in the Articles of Confederation.
In contrast, the adjectival expression "such... as" is comparative,
importing similarity or equivalence of the matters compared. The "such. . . as"
phrase in the 179o Act thus prescribed that the second forum replicate what
pertained in the first, so that, for example, if in the court of its origin a
judgment were conclusive on the parties, it must be taken as conclusive on the
225. Act of March 27, 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298.
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parties by the courts of sister states. If it were interlocutory where rendered, it
must likewise be treated as interlocutory in sister states, and so on.
This "such. . . as" rule was not the only option available to Congress
regarding sister-state effect, and therefore it surely was not the only alternative
considered. In fact, Madison had noted one alternative three years before at the
Constitutional Convention: when other delegates referred to judgments from
one state being "the ground of actions in other States, '226 he had suggested
instead "provid[ing] for the execution of Judgments in other states, under such
regulations as might be expedient. 22 7 He envisioned a judgment creditor
presenting his Virginia judgment, for example, to a Maryland sheriff for levy
against the debtor's Maryland property. Madison thought this "might be safely
done and was justified by the nature of the Union."''  It has been widely
acknowledged that this still remains within Congress's discretion to
prescribe. 9
Without providing for execution in sister states, Congress could have
prescribed that a second state must regard a sister state's judgment as
conclusive even if it might be subject to reconsideration or modification where
rendered, unless and until such reconsideration or modification by the original
forum occurred. Such a rule would have resembled the treatment that English
secular courts for centuries had afforded English ecclesiastical determinations,
which-at least as to marriage-always remained open to ecclesiastical
reconsideration. 3° Drawbacks to this alternative might well have been
perceived; indeed, Justice Washington identified several some years later. 3'
226. See 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 166, at 447 (Madison).
227. Id. at 448.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 24, at 21 ("In 1927 a committee of distinguished lawyers made
an exceptionally able report to the American Bar Association including a proposed bill to
carry out Madison's idea, and the Association recommended its adoption by Congress. The
reform seems to have died a-borning."); Note, Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal
Registration of Judgments Statute, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 488 (1961). For other discussions of
Congress's option to prescribe a system like Madison envisioned, see, for example, Green v.
Sarmiento, 1o F. Cas. 1117, 1118 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 181o) (No. 576o);
and Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
YALE L.J. 421 (1919).
230. See Kenn's Case, (16o6) 77 Eng. Rep. 474, 476 (K.B.) ("[S]ententia contra matrimon'
nunquam transit in remjudicat'."). This proposition, roughly translated as "a determination
controverting a marriage never becomes res judicata," was repeated in a large number of
cases spanning centuries.
231. Sarmiento, 1O F. Cas. at 1119-20.
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The point here, though, is that such a rule was another available alternative the
First Congress did not choose.
Yet another alternative was the one that Massachusetts, while still a colony,
had enacted in 1774 and still had on its statute book when the First Congress
acted under the Constitution. The Massachusetts statute provided that
judgments from other states, when sued on in Massachusetts, were to "have
the same effect and operation, as if' rendered in the Massachusetts court,
regardless of what might have been their "effect and operation" where
rendered.232 In 1788, Jared Ingersoll of Philadelphia had tried unsuccessfully to
persuade the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that this was the import of the
Articles of Confederation's full faith and credit provision,233 but Congress
prescribed the exact converse by the 179o Act.
Which of these rules is better is beside the point. What matters is that
Congress had several options for sister-state effect (including no effect at all)
and had untrammeled discretion to choose among them. Today one might
conclude, perhaps even for reasons apart from familiarity, that the rule the
First Congress chose for judgments was the best of all possible options.
Nevertheless, the "such... as" rule remains a legislative choice made by
Congress in 179o, and was not at all compelled by the Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
There was early disagreement, however, as to whether Congress indeed
had prescribed any sister-state effect even for judgments. The first case to
consider that question affirmed that Congress had indeed done so: Armstrong
v. Carson 34 was an action of debt on a New Jersey judgment brought in
diversity in 1794 in the Federal Circuit Court for Pennsylvania. Defendants
pleaded nil debet (the general issue to an action of debt), under which plea the
defendants could have produced evidence to defeat the obligation that the
232. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
233. Ingersoll argued,
[I]f it is admitted that by this article, the authors of the system intended to make a
Judgment in New Jersey as binding in Pennsylvania, as if it had been obtained in
any County of this State, no other form of words, or mode of expression, could
have been selected more clearly to convey that intention.
Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261, 263 (Pa. 1788) (emphasis omitted) (quoting the argument of
counsel).
Not long after Congress enacted its 179o Act, Massachusetts repealed its contrary
statute -which already had been superseded by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. The 1774
Massachusetts act and its 1795 repeal are both referred to in Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. (1
Tyng) 462,465-66 (1813).
234. 1 F. Cas. 1140 (Wilson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 543).
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plaintiff would have proven prima facie by showing his New Jersey
judgment.23 Nil debet could not have been pleaded in New Jersey, however, for
that plea would open the merits and in New Jersey the first judgment was res
judicata. Thus, applying the "such... as" rule prescribed by Congress's 1790
Act, Justice Wilson held,
If the [nil debet] plea would be bad in the Courts of New-Jersey, it is
bad here: for, whatever doubts there might be on the words of the
constitution the act of congress effectually removes them; declaring in
direct terms, that the record shall have the same effect in this court, as
in the court from which it was taken.236
Justice Wilson's 1794 ruling heralded a revolution in American practice,
proclaiming the end of the prima facie rule for sister-state judgments. Under
the practice of that period, nil debet had been the proper plea in traverse to an
action of debt on a sister-state judgment, but Justice Wilson declared it
forbidden -at least as to judgments that were res judicata at home. In Walker
v. Witter, Lord Mansfield had called a traverse by plea of nul tiel record in such
an action "improper," and Justice Buller had called that plea a "mere nullity. ''237
In stark contrast, Justice Wilson now pronounced it the only plea allowed.
Most importantly, Justice Wilson attributed this revolution not to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, but rather to Congress's 1790 Act.238
Justice Wilson's trumpet did not sound the end of the battle. Nineteen
years later the Supreme Court would affirm that Justice Wilson had gotten it
right, ,39 but until then controversy would rage. The fact that the second
sentence of the 1790 Act did not use the specific word "Effect," instead using
the same ambiguous "faith and credit" phrase employed in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause itself, gave rise to confusion and disagreement- another
unhappy consequence of the "indeterminateness" of this phrase that Madison
lamented.' 4'
In 18o, for example, Judge Jacob Rush of the Pennsylvania Court of
Common Pleas said that Congress
235. Walker v. Witter, (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 1, 4 (K.B.).
236. Arnstrong, 1 F. Cas. at 1140.
237. 99 Eng. Rep. at 4, 6.
238. Armstrong, 1 F. Cas. at 1140 ("[W]hatever doubts there might be on the words of the
constitution, the act of congress effectually removes them .... ").
239. Mills v. Duryee, ii U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813).
240. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison), supra note S, at 287.
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have not said a word, as to what shall be its effect in another
state.... [T]hey only say, it shall have "the same faith and credit" it had
in the courts of the states, from which it was brought. The plain
meaning of which is, it shall be as completely legal evidence of the
existence and correctness of such record, out of the state, as it would be
in the state....
In our opinion, where debt is brought on a judgment obtained in
another state, the defendant should always plead nil debet, in order to
let the court into the circumstances of the case .... And this is the law
and practice in England, in actions of debt on foreign judgments. 4 1
Justice Radcliff of the New York Supreme Court took the same view in 1803, in
Hitchcock v. Aicken, stating,
At first view, the framers of this act seem to have intended a regulation
beyond the provision contained in the constitution; but if this was
their intent, I think they have not accomplished their end....
... The constitution... makes the distinction... between credit
and effect. With this distinction, plainly drawn, I cannot suppose that
congress meant to confound it by treating the terms faith and credit,
as synonymous with effect.... Nothing more than the mode of
authentication was, therefore, provided for by the act of congress.
When so authenticated, they are entitled to full faith and credit; but
they are to be received as evidence merely, by which their contents are
undeniably established, and their effect or operation, not being
declared, remains as at the common law. 42
241. Wright v. Tower, Browne Rep. app., at i, xi, xvi (Pa. C.P. Luzerne County 18ol). In that
case there was a New York judgment against a Pennsylvanian on notes given to a New
Yorker for land in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvanian claimed fraud in the transaction, but he
could not have pleaded fraud in the New York action at law because, in New York, fraud
was cognizable only in equity in the separate Court of Chancery. The Pennsylvanian
therefore pleaded nil debet in the Pennsylvania suit on the New York judgment at law against
him, in order to raise the fraud defense he had no opportunity to prove in New York's court
of the common law.
242. Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Cai. 460, 475-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (opinion of Radcliff, J.).
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And in the same New York case, Justice James Kent 43 opined,
The act of congress does not declare the record shall have the same
effect, but only the same faith and credit, and there is a manifest and
essential difference between the one mode of expression and the
other....
It is pretty evident that the constitution meant nothing more by full
faith and credit, than what respected the evidence of such proceedings;
for the words are applied to public acts, as well as to judicial matters;
nor ought the act of congress to be carried further than the words will
warrant....
The result of my opinion is, that the judgment in question is to be
considered in the light of a foreign judgment, and only prima facie
evidence of the demand.74
Judge Sedgwick of Massachusetts joined the list of Armstrong v. Carson's critics
in 1805, saying that the 179o Act "stops short of declaring what shall be their
effect."245
It should be noted that none of the foregoing state judges maintained that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself mandated giving "Effect" to sister-state
judgments. Instead, those who construed the 179o Act as silent about effect
concluded that, even under the terms of the Clause itself, one state's judgment
need be regarded by other states as nothing more than prima facie evidence.
In contrast, other state judges shared Justice Wilson's understanding of the
179o Act. New York Supreme Court Justice Smith Thompson, for example, in
the 1803 New York case mentioned above, wrote,
Although the act of congress does not adopt the term effect.., yet, if it
means any thing, it means to declare the effect .... It being a subject
243. Justice Kent would become Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court the next year, and
Chancellor ten years later.
244. Hitchcock, 1 Cai. at 481, 483 (opinion of Kent, J.). In Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1811), Justice Kent reaffirmed the prima facie rule of the earlier case, but gave effect to
the judgment out of comity because the defendant failed to produce evidence sufficient to
impeach it.
245. Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 401, 409 (18oS) (opinion of Sedgwick, J.). The other
members of the court shared Justice Sedgwick's conclusion that the sister-state judgment
could be reexamined, just as before the Constitution, taking neither the Clause nor the 1790
Act to displace the prior practice.
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within the power of congress to declare the effect, I do not see why the
act ought not to receive the same construction. If nothing more was
intended than to declare the manner of authenticating such records
and proceedings, this part of the act is useless; nay, worse, it is
mischievous, being calculated to mislead. 
4 6
New Jersey's Judge Pennington also supported Justice Wilson's view, saying in
1805 of New York Justices Radcliff and Kent,
[I]f I understand them, they found their reason principally on the fact
that Congress hath not made use of the word effect. I do not know that
it is necessary for the Legislature in the exercise of a power delegated
to them by the constitution, to make use of the precise words of the
constitution itself. The power given is to prescribe the effect of certain
records. The execution of the power is a law declaring that those
records "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of
the State from whence the said records are, or shall be taken." Is this
not to prescribe the effect? .. . Suppose Congress, instead of enacting
what it hath done, had enacted that those records should have such
faith and credit given to them in every court of the United States, as
the records of the courts of Jamaica, Ireland, France and England have
in the said courts of the United States, would not the effect have been
different? Would it not change the effect from conclusive to prima
facie evidence?... The effect is to depend on the credit given them. If
the credit given them is such as that they cannot be contradicted, they
will have one effect; if the credit given them is such as to make them
prima facie evidence only, then another effect will be produced from
them .... 247
And so the disagreement persisted. 48
246. Hitchcock, 1 Cai. at 464-65 (opinion of Thompson, J.).
247. Curtis v. Gibbs, 2 N.J.L. 399, 403-04 (N.J. 18o5) (Pennington, J.). North Carolina judges
opted for Justice Wilson's Armstrong view, too, in Wade v. Wade, i N.C. 6ol (Super. L. &
Eq. 1804).
248. For further documentation of this disagreement, see Sachs, supra note 32 (manuscript at 19-
47). For a generation, the disagreement was persistent and prominent enough to stir
repeated efforts for clarifying legislation.. Id. Notably, however, it appears that during the
first quarter-century under the Constitution no member of Congress, and no state or federal
judge other than New York's Judge Livingston in his idiosyncratic dissent in the 1803
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V. HEGEMONY AND ECLIPSE OF THE CLASSIC RULE
A. The Early Views of the Supreme Court justices
The Supreme Court had no occasion to apply the 179o Act until long after
Justice Wilson had died, but individual Justices had occasion to deal with the
Act in their Circuit Court duties. Five of the six Justices who would later
participate in the Supreme Court's decision opined separately on the Act, on
the Clause, or on both; and their views were not harmonious. Each is discussed
here in turn.
1. Bushrod Washington
Justice Bushrod Washington, who succeeded Justice Wilson in 1799, was
the next to opine on the "such ... as" rule of the 179o Act. 4 9 In Banks v.
Greenleaf"° in 1799, and again a decade later in Green v. Sarmiento,5 ' Justice
Hitchcock case, see infra notes 269-276, went on record as maintaining that any sister-state
effect was mandated by the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause itself.
249. In Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.C. 1813) (No.
lO,896), Chief Justice Marshall alluded to a ruling by Justice Cushing while sitting at circuit
in Virginia, but if any report of that ruling was made and survives, I have not found it. See
also Bastable v. Wilson, 2 F. Cas. 1012, 1012 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 1097) (indicating that the
"plea of nil debet" was "refused without argument" and that "[j]udgment [was] confessed
saving equity").
250. 2 F. Cas. 756 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1799) (No. 959). The opinion in this
case has sometimes been misunderstood. Greenleaf pleaded a subsequent discharge under
Maryland's bankrupt law to Banks's suit against him in Virginia based on a bond contract,
but Banks demurred, having had no notice of the Maryland proceedings and not having
been party to them. Justice Washington first determined that, under principles of private
international law (apart from admiralty), the Maryland judgment was not one that "can
bind persons [like Banks] residing out of that state," for "if a law of a foreign country were
to declare that a decision of causes, without notice, should bind everybody, no foreign
country would observe it." Id. at 758. Then he inquired what difference, if any, should result
from applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Focusing first on the opening sentence, Justice Washington observed, "Full faith must
be given. Therefore you cannot question the validity of the judgment. This is the
construction given in the case of Armstrong v. Carson, in the circuit court of Pennsylvania,
by Judge Wilson .... " Id. at 759 (citation omitted). Next, however, Justice Washington
paraphrased the very language that Justice Wilson had used to redirect inquiry toward the
179o Act. Justice Wilson had judged sister-state effect according to the "such... as" rule of
that Act (enacted under the second sentence) and had taken the Act-not the Clause-to
preclude a plea in Pennsylvania that could not have been made in New Jersey if enforcement
of the New Jersey judgment had been sought in New Jersey instead. The same "such... as"
rule would mean that Greenleafs plea of a discharge in Maryland would be good in Virginia
1640
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Washington applied and enlarged upon Justice Wilson's view. In the latter case
he observed that a major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was "to
invest congress with the power to declare the judgments of the courts of one
state, conclusive in every other"2 2 - or "even to clothe them with a still more
extended force and effect.12 s3 In contrast, he said, Congress has no power to
if- but only if- it would have been a good plea in Maryland had Banks sued Greenleaf
there.
Even though he construed the "full faith and credit" mandate to mean "you cannot
question the validity of the judgment," Justice Washington sustained Banks' demurrer. That
was because he distinguished between the "validity" of a duly proven sister-state judgment
(that is, its authenticity and accuracy as evidence of what the sister-state court had done)
and its effect (that is, its legally obligatory force, if any). The first sentence of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause concerned the former, but the second sentence of the Clause addressed
the latter: it empowered Congress to go beyond questions of authenticity and accuracy to
prescribe sister-state effect- including whether and to what extent the judgment should be
binding out-of-state. For this, the 179o Act prescribed the "such . . . as" rule, which
contemplated no greater effect elsewhere than at home; and therefore, if the judgment as
rendered fell short of international law standards (for example, if it was entered without
opportunity to defend), that defect would follow it everywhere.
This had not been an issue in Armstrong, but it was the basis of decision in Banks.
Relying on the international law principle he had cited, id. at 758, Justice Washington said
that "[t]his cannot be considered as a judgment ... which can bind persons residing out of
that state" who were not parties, had not received notice, and had not submitted to the
jurisdiction. Id. In effect, he held the first forum's jurisdiction (in the international law
sense) prerequisite to sister-state effect under the 179o Act.
Ralph Whitten evidently misunderstood Washington's use of the word "validity,"
taking Banks v. Greenleaf to hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself requires giving
sister-state judgments some "nonevidentiary effect." Whitten, supra note 30, at 298.
Whitten therefore concluded that Justice Washington's later opinion in Green v. Sarmiento,
lo F. Cas. 1117 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 181o) (No. 576o), applied a contrary
rule. It did not; however, Sarmiento did make Justice Washington's position clearer.
251. 1O F. Cas. 1117. Nadelmann has dated the decision to April 1811. See Nadelmann, supra note
30, at 66.
252. Sarmiento, 1o F. Cas. at 1118.
253. Id. Justice Washington also maintained that Congress, if it chose, could render state
judgments directly enforceable out-of-state:
Why ought not an execution to issue, upon a judgment rendered in one state,
against the person and effects of the defendant, found in any other? It is
unnecessary, however, to moot the policy of the measure, which must rest with
congress in its wisdom to adopt, if it should seem right to that body to do so.
Id. at 1120. This is what Madison had suggested at the Philadelphia Convention. See supra
text accompanying notes 226-229.
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specify what "faith and credit" must be given "as a matter of evidence," because
the Clause itself did that.25 4
Justice Washington also noted that Congress was free to prescribe less than
conclusive effect. To illustrate why this might be appropriate, he cited several
"very embarrassing questions" and "mischievous consequences" that could
follow if sister-state conclusiveness were prescribed for judgments that were
not conclusive at home, or were conclusive there only in part, or only for a
limited time."s Moreover, he said, if the 1790 Act's "such ... as" rule should
prove unsatisfactory, "then I can only say, that the act of congress was not
passed with sufficient consideration; and that it may, and ought to
be... amended.
''2 s6
In sum, Justice Washington at circuit maintained the same view of both the
Clause and the 179o Act that his predecessor, Justice Wilson, had taken in
Armstrong v. Carson.
254. Id. at 1119. Justice Washington therefore concluded that, in saying that authenticated
records and proceedings "shall have such faith and credit given to them ... as ... in the
courts of the state from whence . . . taken," the 179o Act must be understood not as
requiring that "full faith and credit should be given to them as a matter of evidence," but
rather as contemplating "one of the two objects, referred to [Congress] by the
constitution" - to wit, manner of proof, and effect. Because the manner of proof was
provided for in the first sentence of the 179o Act, the Justice reasoned,
the conclusion is inevitable, that this [second] sentence [of the Act] was intended,
and could only have been intended, to declare the force and effect to be given to
records and judicial proceedings, when so authenticated. Under this view of the
subject, the power to limit the effect of such judicial proceedings, is undoubted;
and it was wisely left to the discretion of congress, to regulate the degree of force to
be given to such [sister-state] proceedings.
Id. at 1119; see also Field v. Gibbs, 9 F. Cas. 15, 16 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.J.
1815) (No. 4766) ("The constitution declares, that they shall be entitled to 'full faith and
credit,' and consequently, no law was necessary or would have been proper, to make them
evidence. The law therefore in using the words, 'full faith and credit,' must have meant to
express the effect, to which they were to be entitled in other states."). Incidentally, notice
Justice Washington's - or the reporter's - mistake in adding the adjective "full" to the words
used in the statute.
255. Sarmiento, 10 F. Cas. at 1119. These examples, Justice Washington explained, "and a variety
of other cases, which might be put, show the wisdom of the legislature, in giving to such
judgments, only such credit, as they possess in the state where they were rendered." Id. at
1120. Justice Washington used appositive phrases to emphasize the choice that Congress had
made in prescribing the "such ... as" rule: "as much faith and credit ... as," and "the same
faith and credit ... which .... " Id. The appositive "same ... as" was used again in Short v.
Wilkinson, 22 F. Cas. 15, 1S (No. 12,81o) (C.C.D.C. 1811) (per curiam).
256. Sarmiento, 1O F. Cas. at 1120.
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2. Joseph Story
While still in his mid-twenties, Joseph Story intimated his understanding
of the 179o Act in an 18o5 book on pleading.2 First he recited the observation
and query of another lawyerS as to
whether a Court is bound "to enforce the judgment of a Court in
another State as a matter of course, and without inquiry of the
grounds of the judgment. The act of Congress seems to provide for
the evidence only. In England the Courts will not enforce judgments
rendered by the Courts of their colonies, as judgments, but only as
evidence, prima facie, of a debt.... [A]nd so the law is laid down in
Doug. 4, 5. 259
Story responded, rejecting the prima facie rule referred to in this query by
citing Justice Wilson's opinion in Armstrong v. Carson, which Story accurately
perceived to mean "that no other plea could be admitted, but what would be
admitted in the State Court whence the record was taken.2
6
o
Significantly, this exchange appeared in a section of Story's book about
pleading to declarations of "Debt on Judgments," and under the heading of
"Nul Tiel Record." There was no discussion at all of nil debet. In a competent
book on pleading, this could hardly have been so had young Story not accepted
as prevailing law the pleading revolution that Justice Wilson had heralded in
Armstrong v. Carson. Elsewhere in the same book, and again discussing nul tiel
record, Story noted that copies of judicial records and proceedings
authenticated as prescribed by the 179o Act "are thereby made of the same
force as the originals in the courts where they are"6-that is, the 1790 Act
made the authenticated copies as good in the second forum as the originals
were in the first.
257. JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS (Salem, Barnard B. Macanulty
18o5).
258. Before publication, Story's Pleadings had been "perused by several learned Counsel," id.
Preface at v n. •; and some had made comments which, Justice Story said, he had "quoted
between commas without any particular authority being adduced." See id. at vi.
259. Id. at 296. "Doug. 4, 5" is a reference to Lord Chief Justice Mansfield's opinion in Walker v.
Witter, (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 1, 4-6 (K.B.), which was first published on pages 1 through 7 of
the first volume of Douglas's Reports.
26o. STORY, supra note 257, at 296.
261. Id. at 135 (falling under the heading of "FORMER JUDGMENT," in the section on
"ASSUMPSIT- INBAR")..
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3. John Marshall
Chief Justice John Marshall articulated his view at circuit a few weeks
before the Justices, sitting together as the Supreme Court, would consider the
issue. Like Justice Washington (and the late Justice Wilson and the young
Justice Story), Chief Justice Marshall found it
very clear that the constitution makes a pointed distinction between
the faith and credit, and the effect, of a record in one state when
exhibited in evidence in another. With respect to the former, the
constitution is peremptory that it must have full faith and credit; with
respect to the latter, it provides that congress may prescribe the effect
thereof.262
But Chief Justice Marshall took a different view of the 179o Act than Justices
Wilson, Washington, and Story. Like Judge Rush of the Pennsylvania
Common Pleas in i8ol and Judge Radcliff of the New York Supreme Court in
1803,263 Chief Justice Marshall maintained that although it could have done so,
"congress have not prescribed [a sister-state judgment's] effect. ' ' 264 Like Judge
Rush, Marshall therefore concluded that the sister-state's record "should be
allowed only such [effect] as it possesses on common-law principles'',6, - that
is, it should be taken as prima facie evidence subject to further inquiry.
Thus, like several of his contemporaries, Chief Justice Marshall was misled
by Congress's use of the same ambiguous "faith and credit" phrase employed
in the Clause itself. Instead of following Justices Wilson and Washington and
the young Joseph Story past that verbal obstacle, Marshall said he was unable
to believe that Congress "use[d] the words 'faith and credit' in a sense different
from that which they have in the clause of the constitution upon which they
were legislating. ''266 Of course, Chief Justice Marshall knew that the terms
"faith" and "credit" were commonly used in discussions of evidence, and he
obviously did not believe that those terms by themselves either denoted or
connoted conclusiveness or preclusion. By failing to consider the crucial words
262. Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85, 85 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.C. 1813) (No.
lo,896).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 241-242.
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"such... as"-which surround that phrase in the 179o Act, but not in the
Clause - Chief Justice Marshall missed the crucial point.
4. William Johnson
Sitting in 1802 as a member of the South Carolina Constitutional Court of
Appeals, Judge William Johnson opined that the Clause would be satisfied by
accepting another state's judgment as prima facie evidence, subject to further
examination. 6 7 That much was the almost universal judicial view, shared (as
we have seen) with Justices Washington and Story and the late Justice Wilson;
but Judge Johnson reached an outcome different than Justices Washington or
Story would have reached, because he applied a peculiar state rule of practice
regarding proof of prior judgments. 68 Doing so was an affront to Congress's
supervening power, under the second sentence of the Clause, to prescribe the
manner in which sister-state judgments "shall be proved"; and no other
Federal Justice made this mistake.
5. Henry Brockholst Livingston
In 1803, sitting as a New York Supreme Court Justice in Hitchcock, the
same New York case discussed earlier, 69 Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston
had construed the Clause very differently from anyone else. Justice Livingston
seems to have been the first, and for some time the only, jurist to maintain that
the constitutional Clause by itself requires a court where a judgment from a
sister state is presented to replicate the effect which that judgment had whence
it came. Indeed, in the entire first quarter-century under the Constitution, no
other judge, state or federal, appears by my research to have gone on record as
maintaining that sister-state effect was mandated by the Constitution's Full
Faith and Credit Clause itself. (Neither, so far as it appears, was that position
propounded by any member of Congress in the course of the several efforts
267. Hammon & Hattaway v. Smith, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 110, 114 (1802) (opinion ofJohnson, J.).
268. Judge Johnson said that a rule of state practice precluded pleading nul tiel record to a sister-
state judgment, and allowed only nil debet, because on replication to a nul tiel record plea "the
original record ought to be inspected; but [with foreign or sister-state judgments] this is
impossible. An exemplification of our own judgments is not evidence in such cases, and
therefore an exemplification of the judgment of a sister State, certainly ought not to be." Id.
at 114.
269. Hitchcock v. Aicken, i Cai. 460, 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (opinion of Livingston, J.); see
supra notes 242, 244, 246.
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documented by Stephen Sachs 27° to amend further or to replace the 1790 Act
during the thirty years following its enactment.) In Justice Livingston's own
words in Hitchcock, that Clause requires any state court where a sister-state's
judgment is presented to "believe it to be just, and that the matter in dispute
was properly decided," disallowing any attempt to impeach it on the merits.27'
"[T]o give full faith and credit to a record," Justice Livingston asserted,
"cannot consist with not believing it ourselves, or permitting others to make
averments against it.",2 72
Justice Livingston also said in Hitchcock,
[M]y opinion is drawn from the constitution, and is altogether
independent of this [1790] act; for it is not clear that congress had any
thing to do with the effect of domestic judgments. It is extraordinary,
to say the least, that after the constitution had declared that "full faith
and credit" were to be given them, it should be left with congress to
vary their operation, if they thought proper.... Instead, then, of
expecting congress to settle the effect of domestic judgments, we must
not look further than the constitution itself. 273
Thus did Justice Livingston's solitary and idiosyncratic opinion articulate what
eventually 274 would become the modern "orthodox" view.
New York's Chief Justice Morgan Lewis had challenged Justice Livingston
to explain what point there could be in empowering. Congress, by the second
sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to prescribe "the effect thereof," if
the first sentence itself mandated such sister-state "effect." Justice Livingston
had replied (with some strain on the grammar) that the word "thereof' refers
not to "such Acts, Records and Proceedings," but only to "the Manner in
Which" they "shall be proved"-so that Congress was authorized to prescribe
the effect only of such authentication procedures as it might prescribe.2 75 This
tortured construction utterly disregarded the drafting history of the Clause,276
as to which Justice Livingston was plainly oblivious.
zo. See supra note 32.
a27. Hitchcock, i Cai. at 469.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 471.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 302-313.
275. Hitchcock, 1 Cai. at 468.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 185-201.
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B. The Classic Supreme Court Construction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the 179o Act
Presciently, when he stated his own view a few weeks earlier, Chief Justice
Marshall had'observed, "It is very doubtful, however, whether this opinion
would receive the sanction of the supreme court. 277 Indeed, when the Justices
at last considered the matter together in Mills v. Duryee,278 the Chief Justice's
interpretation of the 179o Act was accepted by no one, and he even abandoned
it himself. What prevailed in 1813 instead was the view propounded at length
by Justice Washington at circuit,2 79 and originally by the late Justice Wilson. "8 °
The Supreme Court's opinion in Mills, however, was written not by Justice
Washington but by the youngest of the Justices, Joseph Story, then age thirty-
four, who with Justice Gabriel Duval had joined the Court just thirteen months
earlier. As already noted, Story had evidenced his attachment to the Wilson
(hence the Washington) view eight years prior, in his book on pleading. (His
solitary switch to a contrary view would not occur until later. 81) So far as it
277. Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85, 85 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.C. 1813) (No.
1O,896).
278. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
279. See Green v. Sarmiento, 1O F. Cas. 1117, 1118 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 181o)
(No. 5760); Banks v. Greenleaf, 2 F. Cas. 756 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va.
1799) (No. 959). Just as Justice Washington's opinion in Banks was misunderstood by
Whitten, see supra note 250, so his opinion in Sarmiento had been misunderstood by
Nadelmann. Justice Washington took considerable care repeatedly to distinguish between
the "fill faith and credit" to be given "as a matter of evidelce," on the one hand, and "the
force and effect to be given," on the other; and he said the Constitution only "pronounced
upon" the former, while the latter was "wisely left to the discretion of congress." Green, 1O F.
Cas. at iii; see supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text. Yet Nadelmann characterized
Justice Washington as "on record for deducing the conclusive effect from the Constitution,"
and therefore was puzzled "how a majority could have been obtained" two years later, in
Mills v. Duryee, "for resting the [Supreme Court's] decision on the Act of Congress rather
than on the Constitution." Nadelmann, supra note 30, at 68.
Indeed, Nadelmann actually faulted the Supreme Court's Mills v. Dutyee opinion for
comparing so poorly with Washington's "elaborate opinion" in Sarmiento, id. at 66, which
Nadelmann regarded as holding to the contrary, id. at 68, although it certainly did not.
Nadelmann's mistaken impression that the phrase "faith and credit" was "a term of art," a
"formula" having a fixed meaning for centuries, id. at 44, overlooks Justice Washington's
actual argument, which used that phrase with its very different (although demonstrably far
more common) evidentiary meaning.
280. See Armstrong v. Carson, 1 F. Cas. 1140 (Wilson, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No.
543); supra text accompanying note 236.
281. Justice Story would propound that contrary view in his Commentaries on the Constitution. See
infra text accompanying notes 302-313.
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appears, both Justices Marshall and Livingston282 now silently joined in Justice
Story's opinion for the Court, as did Justice Duval and, of course, Justice
Washington. Only Justice Johnson dissented, reiterating the view he had taken
as a state judge eleven years before. The seventh Justice at the time, Thomas
Todd, was absent.
Mills was an action of debt on a New York judgment. 83 The defendant had
pleaded nil debet, to which the plaintiff had entered a general demurrer. Upon
that demurrer the trial court held the nil debet plea bad. This comported with
the rulings of Justices Wilson and Washington at circuit. The Supreme Court
now affirmed.
To defendant's argument that the prior judgment "ought to be considered
prima facie evidence only," Justice Story answered for the Court,
It is manifest however that the constitution contemplated a power in
congress to give a conclusive effect to such judgments. And we can
perceive no rational interpretation of the act of congress, unless it
declares a judgment conclusive when a Court of the particular state
where it is rendered would pronounce the same decision. s4
282. It is perhaps conceivable that Justice Livingston silently retained his idiosyncratic view of
the Clause, and reached the same result disregarding the statute. Nothing indicates,
however, that he was less than fully persuaded by Justice Story's opinion for the Court;
indeed, Chief Justice Marshall had intimated in Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85 (Marshall,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.C. 1813) (No. 10,896), that Justice Livingston had already changed
his view. As to Chief Justice Marshall, we know that upon deliberation with his colleagues
he abandoned his own earlier view- an illustration of his often overlooked amenability to
persuasion by arguments better reasoned than his own. Chief Justice Marshall himself wrote
for the Court five years later reaffirming Mills in Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
234 (1818), again with the silent acquiescence (and seeming concurrence) of Justice
Livingston.
283. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813). The second forum in Mills was actually
not a state -it was the District of Columbia. The 179o Act had made its "such ... as" rule
applicable not only to states (by virtue of its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause),
but to "every Court within the United States," supra note 217, supported by Congress's
power of "Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" regarding the Federal District, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
284. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813). Justice Story observed that the defendant's view would
render the Full Faith and Credit Clause "utterly unimportant and illusory," because "[t]he
common law would give such judgments precisely the same effect." Id. This was the same
point James Wilson had made at the Constitutional Convention, saying that "if the
Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing
more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations." 2 FARRAND, RECORDS,
supra note 166, at 488 (Madison). For further discussion of Justice Wilson's view, see supra
text accompanying notes 234-236.
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Thus, in notable contrast to the position that Livingston had previously
taken,28 Justice Story in Mills did not say the Clause by itself gave sister-state
judgments conclusive effect. Instead, just like Justices Wilson and Washington
earlier at circuit, he attributed the effect solely to the 1790 Act.
To the defendant's contention that "this act provides only for the
admission of such records as evidence, but does not declare the effect of such
evidence when admitted," Justice Story answered,
[t]his argument cannot be supported[.] The act declares that the
record duly authenticated shall have such faith and credit as it has in
the state Court from whence it is taken. If in such Court it has the faith
and credit of evidence of the highest nature, viz. record evidence, it must
have the same faith and credit in every other Court. Congress have
therefore declared the effect of the record by declaring what faith and
credit shall be given to it.286
This statement repudiated the view that Chief Justice Marshall had articulated
at circuit. Just as Justices Washington and Wilson would have done, Justice
Story reasoned, "[I]t is beyond all doubt that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of New York was conclusive upon the parties in that state. It must,
therefore, be conclusive here also ' S - not by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, but by virtue of the 1790 Act.
On the pleading point, Justice Story and the Court now held exactly as
Justice Wilson had in 1794: the only permissible plea in traverse to an action on
a sister-state judgment was nul tiel record. The plea of nil debet in such cases,
Justice Story wrote for the Court, "cannot be sustained," because
[t]he pleadings in an action are governed by the dignity of the
instrument on which it is founded. If it be a record, conclusive
between the parties, it cannot be denied but by the plea of nul tiel
record; and when congress gave the effect of a record to the judgment
281it gave all the collateral consequences.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 269-274.
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In answer to the view taken in Justice Johnson's dissent, the Court responded,
"[t]here is no difficulty in the proof. It may be proved in the manner prescribed
by the act, and such proof is of as high a nature as an inspection, by the Court,
of its own record. ''289
Thus, Mills v. Duryee completed the pleading revolution heralded by Justice
Wilson in Armstrong v. Carson. Both Mills and Armstrong attributed this
supervention of the prima facie rule for American interstate2 9° practice not to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself, but solely to the 1790 Act of Congress.
The Court's holding in Mills was not immediately accepted by the courts in
every state. Some disagreement persisted for more than a decade. '9 Certainly
by using the "extremely indeterminate"'2 9 "faith and credit" phrase in
prescribing its "such . . . as" rule, the First Congress had made the 179o Act less
pellucid than it could have been. As Stephen Sachs has very well shown,
proposals in Congress to clarify, improve, or change that rule recurred for
some thirty years. 93 Particularly in light of the practice preceding it and in the
context of the 179o Act as a whole, however, the import of that Act's
"such... as" rule was plain enough to be seen; and as the Justices held firm in
their collective opinion, disagreement gradually faded away. It thus became the
settled understanding that in prescribing "such faith and credit ... as they
have" whence taken, the 179o and 1804 Acts were not redundant to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause at all. Rather, they stated Congress's will regarding
sister-state effect, prescribing a replication rule for sister-state "Records and
judicial Proceedings" and no federal requirement of effect at all for "public
Acts."
289. Id.
29o. For international cases, American courts continued applying the prima facie rule.
Increasingly during the nineteenth century, however, habituation to the more generous rule
statutorily prescribed for interstate cases (and growing familiarity with foreign institutions)
encouraged departures from the prima facie rule, and a pronounced "tendency . . . to
constantly narrow the differences between [sister-state] judgments and those of wholly
foreign states by raising the latter to [the] same plane of recognition" was noted. 3 A.C.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1482 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed.
1925).
291. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. (17 Tyng) 515, 545-46 (1822); Bissell v. Briggs, 9
Mass. (8 Tyng) 462 (1813); Robinson v. Prescott, 4 N.H. 450 (1828); Pawling v. Willson, 13
Johns. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Buford v. Buford, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 241 (1814); see also 2
HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, INCLUDING THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA § 856, at 1027 (1st ed. 189i).
292. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
293. Sachs, supra note 32 (manuscript at 26-72).
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Mills v. Duryee was followed five years later without dissent, with Chief
Justice Marshall himself noting for the Court that "[t] his is precisely the same
case as that of Mills v. Dutyee."294 Mills was followed again, and its rationale
reiterated and reaffirmed, in M'Elmoyle v. Cohen in 1839.295 There was no
dissent in M'Elmoyle, where Justice Wayne observed for the Court that the
phrase "and the effect thereof' in the second sentence of the Clause
was intended to provide the means [to wit, "general laws"] of giving
to [sister-state judgments] the conclusiveness of judgments upon the
merits, when it is sought to carry them into judgments by suits in the
tribunals of another state....
... [This] provid[ed] in the Constitution for the deficiency which
experience had shown to be in the provision of the confederation; as
the Congress under it could not legislate upon what should be the
effect of a judgment obtained in one state in the other states.296
Both the authenticity- that is, the manner of authentication or proof-of a
judgment, "and its effect [in sister-states], depend upon the law made in
pursuance of the Constitution," Justice Wayne emphasized. 97 He credited the
1790 Act's "such ... as" phrase with making sister-state judgments
record evidence of a debt, or judgments of record, to be contested only
in such way as judgments of record may be; and,
consequently.., conclusive upon the defendant in every state, except
for such causes as would be sufficient to set aside the judgment in the
Courts of the state in which it was rendered.29 s
Only "the faith and credit due to it as the judicial proceeding of a state," Justice
Wayne wrote, "is given by the Constitution, independently of all
legislation."' 99 In contrast, "the judgment is made [for sister-states] a debt of
294. Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818). No one on the Court dissented
even though Justice Johnson, who had dissented alone in Mills, was still sitting.
295. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
296. Id. at 324, 326.
297. Id. at 325.
298. Id. at 326.
299. Id. at 324-25.
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record, not examinable upon its merits," only "[b]y the law of the 26th of May,
1790. 3
0 0
C. Justice Story's Change of Mind
The classic rule of faith and credit thus prevailed in the Supreme Court well
into the 186os.3" By then, however, a contrary view was gaining support, and
eventually it would displace the classic rule.
The idiosyncratic view that Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston had
articulated as a state judge in 1803302 had been taken up ten years later (without
credit to Justice Livingston, who might have abandoned it already) by
Massachusetts Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons and one of his colleagues. In
Bissell v. Briggs,3"' they had seized upon the absence of two of the three still-
active Justices remaining from when the same court had ruled unanimously to
the contrary eight years before, °4 and by rump majority had adopted Justice
Livingston's old notion as the rule for Massachusetts.10 '
That event in Boston occurred in March 1813, so near the very date of the
Mills decision that, given primitive means of communication, the federal and
state tribunals were probably not contemporaneously aware of each other's
proceedings. But Chief Justice Parsons had been a mentor to Story, and Story
300. Id. at 325. Explaining further, the Court said that "under the first section of the fourth article
of the Constitution [that is, the Clause itself], judgments out of the state in which they are
rendered, are only evidence in a sister state that the subject matter of the suit has become a
debt of record [where rendered]." Id. at 325. The Court also expressed agreement with the
statement in a Georgia case that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "only provides, that as a
matter of evidence it shall be entitled to full faith and credit." Id. at 329.
Justice Jackson and Nadelmann both misconstrued M'Elmoyle by supposing (as modern
orthodoxy requires) that the 1839 Court instead was using the "faith and credit" phrase in
the Constitution to mean sister-state effect. See Jackson, supra note 24, at 11; Nadelmann,
supra note 30, at 74.
301. See, e.g., Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290, 301-02 (1866) (reciting that the Clause
empowered Congress, whose Act in turn prescribed effect); see also D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850) (attributing sister-state effect to intent of Congress with no
suggestion that the Clause itself required such effect).
302. See supra notes 269-276.
303. 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 462 (1813).
304. See Bartlet v. Knight, 1 Mass. (I Will.) 401 (18o5).
305. Nine years later, the next Massachusetts Chief Justice, Isaac Parker, wrote in Commonwealth
v. Green, 17 Mass. (17 Tyng) 515, 545 (1822), that while Mills v. Duryee must be
acknowledged, "[i]n this commonwealth the construction of the constitution, and of the act
of congress, must be considered as definitively settled in the case of Bissell v. Briggs."
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as a young legislator had championed some of Parsons's causes. Justice Story
fondly reminisced to his own Harvard students of the many evenings of
stimulating discussion he had enjoyed with the much older Parsons.3" 6 I have
no proof, but it is easy to envision Justice Story being especially amenable to
dissuasion when he found his own opinion in Mills at odds with that of this
esteemed mentor. Bissell thus might have been the precipitant of Justice Story's
change of mind. In any event, whether before or after he began his parallel
career as Dane Professor at Harvard in 1829, Justice Story did abandon the
view of the Clause and the 179o Act that he had articulated for the Supreme
Court in Mills. The view he endorsed as the "sounder interpretation" in his
1833 Commentaries on the Constitution"7 and later worksos was the view
propounded by Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons in Bissell v. Briggs and
originally articulated by Judge Henry Brockholst Livingston in 1803.
Justice Story's various treatises circulated widely and came to be
increasingly relied upon by advocates and courts. Thus, gradually and without
306. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARvARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL
CONDITIONS IN AMERICA 258-59 (1908).
307. 3 STORY, supra note lo9, §§ 13o6-1307, at 182.
308. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 137 (1840) (ignoring the prior year's M'Elmoyle opinion and reiterating instead the
"sounder interpretation" -that Congress has power only to "prescribe the mode of
authentication, and the effect of such authentication, when duly made"). Also in the 1841
second edition of his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Justice Story expressed the
disagreement with his M'Elmoyle colleagues that he had declined to give voice in the report
of that case, asserting that the judgment at issue came "within the clause of the constitution,
which declares that fill faith, and credit, and effect shall be given," and omitting any
mention of the 179o Act. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS § 582a,
at 841 (2d ed. 1841).
In addition, the same year that his Commentaries on the Constitution were published,
Story prepared an "Abridgement" of them "for the use of Colleges and High-schools,"
indulging
the hope, that even in this reduced form the reasoning in favour of every clause of
the constitution will appear satisfactory and conclusive; and that the youth of my
country will learn to venerate and admire it as the only solid foundation, on which
to rest our national union, prosperity, and glory.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ABRIDGED BY
THE AUTHOR, at vii-viii (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (1833). In his
very brief treatment of the topic in this Abridgement, Justice Story repeated his assertion that
the full faith and credit provisions in both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution were "intended to give the same conclusive effect to judgments of all the states,
so as to promote uniformity, as well as certainty, in the rule among them," and he made no
mention the 1790 statute or of the reasoning the Court in Mills v. Duryee had actually
employed. Id. S 66o, at 471-72.
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any discussion focused on the point, what first had been Justice Livingston's
eccentric opinion, abandoned by him but resuscitated by Chief Justice Parsons
as the Massachusetts rule,3°9 eventually became the orthodox view on the
strength of Justice Story's name.310 Mills continued to be cited sometimes
(although shunned by Justice Story himself), but the fact that its opinion
squarely contradicts the view that Justice Story propounded for the rest of his
life seems never to have been recognized or confronted.
Justice Story had been able to join silently in the Court's 1839 M'Elmoyle
opinion despite having already abandoned the classic rule which that case
reemphasized and employed, because he considered it "not, practically
speaking, of much importance" whether one attributed the requirement of
replicating effect to the Act of Congress or instead to the Clause itself-provided
the statute prescribed the same rule of effect that Justice Story had come to
attribute to the Clause.31' For judgments, the 179o Act had done that, and
therefore the distinction made no practical difference in M'Elmoyle. By virtue of
his vigorous commitment to traditional territorial limits on legislative
jurisdiction,312 Justice Story seems never to have reckoned with any possible
sister-state effect for statutes." 3
3o9. See supra notes 302-305 and accompanying text.
310. Mills, M'Elmoyle, and D'Arcy all had attributed the replication rule solely to the 179o Act.
Early in the process of change, the Clause and Act were treated as imposing that rule
together. See, e.g., Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462, 465 (1873) (stating
that the Act, "in connection with the constitutional provision which it was intended to carry
out," required the same effect elsewhere as where rendered, "the constitutional provision
and act of Congress giving full faith, credit, and effect"). In time, however, the replication
rule came to be attributed to the Clause alone. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230
(19o8) (describing the rule as a constitutional one merely "confirmed by the Act of May 26,
1790"). Even the Fauntleroy dissent conceived the issue as whether the Clause itself produced
the effect at issue, and never mentioned the statute. Id. at 244 (White, J., dissenting).
311. See 3 STORY, supra note 109, § 1307, at 182 ("[I]t is not, practically speaking, of much
importance, which interpretation prevails; since each admits the competency of congress to
declare the effect ofjudgments, when duly authenticated; so always, that full faith and credit
are given to them; and congress by their legislation have already carried into operation the
objects of the clause.").
312. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 7-9, 18, 20, 25 (1834).
313. Justice Story's discussion in his Commentaries on the Constitution mentioned statutes only
with regard to "verity" (authenticity and proof), and never with regard to extra-state effect.
3 STORY, supra note lo9, §§ 1303-1304, at 178-8o. In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,
he treated the Full Faith and Credit Clause only in a chapter entitled "Foreign Judgments."
See STORY, supra note 312, § 337, at 491.
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CONCLUSION
Under the "classic rule" of faith and credit, the only provisions of federal
law requiring that any of the United States give effect (as distinguished from
prima facie evidentiary sufficiency) to sister-state "Acts," "Records," or
"judicial Proceedings" are those provisions (if any) that Congress has
legislatively prescribed. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is neutral as to what
policies regarding sister-state effect Congress might elect to prescribe; and
those policies, of course, might vary from subject to subject and from time to
time. For well over two centuries, however, beginning in 1790, Congress has
exercised its power in this regard rarely, responsibly, and-but for a curious
1948 lapse314 -with reasonable care. This record justifies some confidence that
Congress is unlikely now to begin dealing with sister-state effect in a manner
destructive to the national Union.
Moreover, whatever its troubling inefficiencies and other, occasionally
scandalous limitations, the legislative branch is far better suited to weigh
popular wishes and answer felt social needs than any other government official
or set of officials - executive, administrative, or even judicial - can be expected
to be. That is the enduringly wise judgment made by the statesmen who
crafted the second sentence of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause,
by the citizens who approved it in the ratification process, and by the Justices
who consistently obeyed it in Supreme Court decisions through most of the
nineteenth century. That enduringly wise judgment has never been
countermanded- although it has been neglected, forgotten, and obscured from
view for about a century and a quarter. But it is not the endorsement of the
Founders, or of other generations long dead, that makes recovery of the classic
rule of faith and credit a worthy objective today. Rather, it is the practical
wisdom inherent in that original, deliberately made choice.
The general statutory prescription that states replicate the effect of sister-
state "records" and "judicial proceedings" has remained continuously in force
for more than two centuries, with no change more substantial than the
substitution of "same... as" for the "such... as" phrase of the 179o Act.315
This general prescription has proven to be wise and beneficent, and it stands at
no risk of repeal. There is a large accumulation of judicial decisions construing
and applying it. While judicial opinions since the 188os have typically mistaken
the requirement as a constitutional one, it is neither strengthened nor
314. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)),
with Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 122, and Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. LVI, 2 Stat. 298.
315. See supra notes 13-20, 24 and accompanying text.
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improved by its erroneous attribution to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Moreover, the usefulness of most of the case law gloss will be undiminished by
acknowledging that the requirement instead is a statutory one.
In fact, the ill-fated 1948 attempt to alter the scope of this prescription
illustrates how resistant to change the statute's general requirement of
replication has been. By that date, Congress's original decision against
prescribing any sister-state effect for legislative acts had stood for over a century
and a half, but decades of judicial error36 and insufficiently critical
commentary 17 had firmly ensconced the notion that the constitutional Clause
was "self-executing" -not only as to the (evidentiary) "full faith and credit"
mandate but as to sister-state effect as well. Consequently, when the revisers
drafting the 1948 Judicial Code included "acts of the legislature of any State"
within their "same ... as" prescription of sister-state effect, , 8 they assumed
they were making no substantive change; and the Congress enacting their
proposals presumably intended nothing more. "What, if anything, was
intended to be accomplished by this amendment," Willis Reese wrote in 1952,
"is by no means clear, since, so far as appears, it was enacted by Congress
without discussion and the Revisers' Notes state simply that it 'follows the
language' of the full faith and credit clause itself."'319 Prominent conflict of laws
theorist Brainerd Currie, however, denounced the 1948 innovation as a
"notably footless piece of draftsmanship" and ridiculed the notion of
316. E.g., Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Chi. & Alton R.R. v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887); see supra text accompanying note 14; cases cited
supra notes 19-2o and accompanying text.
317. E.g., COOLEY, supra note 15; George P. Costigan, Jr., The History of the Adoption of Section I of
Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of That
Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 470, 477, 478 n.2 (1904) (asserting that
"while the proposition has never been expressly decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, the dicta are all to the effect that the first sentence of the full faith and credit
clause is self-executing" as to effect, and that "[t]here seems to be no reason to doubt that"
even outside the terms of the federal statute "the sister-state judgment would be given the
full benefit of the constitutional provision"); Jackson, supra note 24, at 11-12 ("Congress has
provided no guidance as to when extraterritorial recognition shall be accorded either to a
state's statutes or to its common law. Since the Constitutional provision must now be
regarded as self-executing [as to effect], however, the courts have been obliged to solve
issues under it as best they could.... The Constitution by use of the term 'public acts'
clearly includes statutes. But it makes no mention of decisional law.... [T] he Court has so
acted and talked that we may deal with this ... on the assumption that what is entitled in
proper cases to credit is the law of a state by whatever source declared.").
318. 1948 Judicial Code, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)).
319. Willis L.M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CHI. L.
REV. 339, 343 (1952).
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replicating the effect of sister-state statutes as "simply unintelligible.""32 And
Ralph Whitten has observed, "[T]he Revisers obviously did not know what
the Constitution meant. Indeed, it is questionable whether they gave it much
thought."'
Absurd consequences32 from that 1948 drafting fiasco have been avoided
only because, in effect, the Supreme Court increasingly has declined to take the
1948 Code's nominal prescription to replicate the effect of sister-state
legislative acts seriously." 3
Calls for Congress to undertake comprehensive efforts toward uniform
resolution of choice of law problems3 4 have failed to stir significant action for
generations, and there seems no reason to suppose that Congress will be more
responsive to calls for comprehensive change in the future. Any future effort by
Congress to prescribe sister-state effect for any state "public Acts," and any
further departures from the general prescription to replicate the effect of
"Records" and "judicial Proceedings," in all probability will be exceptional,
occasional, and narrowly directed to address particular perceived needs. The
32o. BRAINERD CuRRiE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 200 (1963).
321. Whitten, State Choice of Law, supra note 1o8, at 62.
322. See Ala. Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (Stone, J.) ("A
rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause.., would lead to the absurd
result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the
courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.").
323. The accelerating flight from Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), SO far
has included the following: Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981), which
declared that typically a given set of facts "may justify, in constitutional terms, application of
the law of more than one jurisdiction"; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822
(1985), which said that "[n]either the Due Process Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires [a state] to substitute for its own [laws], applicable to persons and events
within it, the conflicting statute of another state"; Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722
(1988), which declared that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter
concerning which it is competent to legislate"'; Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
233 (1998), which held that "[a] court may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy' in
determining the law applicable to a controversy"; and Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 538 U.S.
488, 494 (2003), which said the Constitution "does not compel" a state to substitute the
statute of any other state for its own where it has legislative jurisdiction. In the words of
Justice Scalia for the Court in the Sun Oil case, today's Justices firmly refuse to "embark
upon the enterprise of constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules." 486 U.S. at 727-28.
324. E.g., Walter W. Cook, supra note 229; Edward S. Corwin, supra note 200; Jackson, supra
note 24; see also Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L.
R~v. 2134 (1991) (calling for efforts through the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws).
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Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980325 and the 1994 Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Actz 6 illustrate the scale of changes that
might be realistically anticipated.
But this certainly does not diminish the importance of recognizing federal
prescriptions of sister-state effect as dependent entirely on Congress's
discretion. First, the 1980 and 1994 acts just mentioned are prototypes that
might be found worthy of emulation or approximation in various other subject
areas. And second, significant benefits from recognition of Congress's entire
discretion over sister-state effect can be manifested by reflection upon section 2
of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). That section's negation of any
obligation that might otherwise exist to "give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State" regarding same-sex relationships that
such other state treats as a "marriage"3 27 received overwhelming endorsements
in both houses of Congress when it was enacted in 1996;328 and it since has
been buttressed by statutory or constitutional provisions (or both) in the vast
majority of states. Many in the nation's younger generation now seem less
determined to disallow same-sex marriage than do their elders, however; so
that, as political times change, it might happen that DOMA will be repealed -
or even replaced by a federal statute to the contrary, requiring sister-state
replication of effect for such relationships.
Far more likely-and therefore more important-than such an eventuality,
is the prospect of limited congressional modification of DOMA to eliminate or
ameliorate various perverse and presumably unintended consequences that
DOMA has entailed. Many of these have been catalogued by Andrew
Koppelman,329 and it is unnecessary to reiterate them here. But it is difficult to
believe that any but the most resolute and rigid opponents of the freedom not
to conform to conventional standards of human affection and relationship
behavior, would insist-once duly informed-upon maintaining such
325. 28 U.S.C. § 173 8A (2000).
326. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 2265.
327. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
328. DOMA passed by margins of more than five to one (342 to 67) in the House, and six to one
in the Senate (85 to 14). See Final Vote Results for Role Call 316,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/ro1316.xml (last visited May 1, 2009); Roll Call Vote
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll call-vote-cfm.cfm?congress= 104
&session=2&vOte=0028o (last visited May 1, 2009). DOMA was signed into law by
President William J. Clinton (who, at the time, was in his fourth year as President and
anticipating a reelection campaign).
329. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS
STATE LINES (2006).
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fortuitous, pointless, anomalous, and inhumane consequences. Some of these
might fail to survive judicial scrutiny if they were litigated; but leaving
insufficiently vetted legislation to be repaired (or further confounded) by
hither-and-yon litigation over a span of decades is too random and expensive
to be considered reasonable. Efforts to moderate and accommodate a free
people's fiercely held differences is what statecraft and political dialogue-not
judicial fiat-are for. Much justice can be done by piecemeal legislative
adjustment, whether or not-or until-greater movement in any chosen
direction can be made.
Or so the plain language of this highly important separation-of-powers
provision in our imperfect but remarkably insightful and resilient
Constitution- now illuminated by its origins and the first century of its
history-presumes.
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